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Non-technical summary: A macroeconomic model based on search-theoretical
foundations is built to show that in an economy with structural deficiencies of the
Russian Virtual Economy, money substitutes appear as a result of optimizing behavior of
agents. Moreover, the volume of money substitutes is typically large, and it is impossible
reduce their volume significantly by using standard instruments as an increase of the
money supply or decreasing the tax level. The result obtains for an economy, where there
are large natural monopolies and widespread informal networks. Many interesting
properties of the economy are derived; in particular, it is shown that money substitutes
serve as a transmission belt of value from restructured effective firms to old ineffective
ones thereby decreasing an incentive to restructure. In addition, the presence of large
natural monopolies and widespread informal networks increase the incentives for the
capital flight.SEARCH-MONEY-AND-BARTER MODELS OF FINANCIAL STABILIZATION
S.I.Boyarchenko and S.Z.Levendorski￿ i
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Abstract One of the key features of the Russian ￿virtual economy￿ is the wide-spread
usage of barter and money substitutes. We apply the search-theoretical approach to
Monetary Theory to construct a macroeconomic model, which allows us to analyze the
appearance of money substitutes which are issued by some agents of the economy, and
the interaction of these substitutes with genuine money.
We model Russian economy as consisting of two sectors: a sector of old, mainly inef-
fective agents (￿rms) (1-sector), who can collude so that promissory notes one of them
issues are redeemed by others, while a sector of new, eﬀective ￿rms (0-sector) cannot. The
sizes of the sectors, the money supply, the utility function and marginal production costs
of agents are given exogenously, and trading strategies, prices, the amount of notes in
circulation and the distribution of the money between sectors are found in an equilibrium
as the result of optimizing behavior of agents of the economy and the colluding sector.
The main ￿nding is that in an economy with such structure, the money substitutes
appear and circulate, and it is impossible to make them disappear by changing the money
supply unless the economy splits into two disjoint ones. By issuing notes, the ineﬀective
sector preserves its stability, and ensures the transfer of value from the eﬀective sector.
¿From the point of view of our model, the most eﬀective way to restrict the usage of
money substitutes is the simultaneous
￿ increase of the money supply;
￿ demonopolization of note-issuing large ￿rms, like Gazprom and UES ￿ notes of
smaller ￿rms are less acceptable, and
￿ heavy taxation of intermediaries involved in organizing of barter chains.
We show that there exists an optimal level of the money supply in the economy from
the point of view of the colluding 1-sector, so that there is a strong incentive for 1-sector
to transfer new money out of the economy, should the new money arrive. This observation
may provide an additional explanation for the capital ￿ight. The more eﬀective 1-sector,
the lower an optimal amount of the money in the economy for this sector, hence the
larger the incentive for the capital ￿ight. It means, in particular, that the investment in
the energy sector (a core of the sector of colluding agents) at the expense of restructured
enterprises of 0-sector increases the incentive for the capital ￿ight.
At the same time, at low levels of the money supply, its increase is good for eﬀective
agents. Similarly, the welfare of agents of diﬀerent types can move in opposite directions as
other exogenous parameters of an economy change. This means that the total welfare for
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such an economy is an ill-de￿ned concept, and one has to analyze the welfare of diﬀerent
types of agents separately.
We introduce such characteristics of the trading process, as the trading friction into
the search-theoretical approach to monetary economics, and show that the type of an
equilibrium crucially depends on the value of friction.
We analyze how such factors, as the trading friction, the level of ineﬀectiveness, the size
of the note-issuing sector and the money supply in￿uence the state of the economy, and
show that the stability of an economy with interacting sectors is preserved if and only if
the instability index = the product of the level of ineﬀectiveness, the defect of the money
supply and the inverse of trading friction does not cross a certain instability threshold.
Thus, if the ineﬀectiveness is large, large trading friction and/or money supply are needed
to prevent an economy from splitting.
We also show that if both the trading friction and ineﬀectiveness of agents are small,
then there may exist three types of equilibria:
￿ without trade between the sectors, with money circulating in 0-sector;
￿ when 1-sector uses only notes in trades with 0-sector, and
￿ when both money and notes circulate between sectors.
In the last two cases, both money and notes circulate inside 0-sector.
Depending on parameters￿ values, either of these equilibria can be optimal from the
point of view of one sector or both. If the trading friction is very small then the second
equilibrium is superior from the point of view of the welfare of 1-sector, so that it does not
use money, but if the trading friction is not very small, the money supply is fairly large,
and 1-sector is rather eﬀective, then the usage of money becomes optimal for 1-sector. A
type of an equilibrium optimal for 1-sector may be optimal for the eﬀective 0-sector, and
may be non-optimal. In particular, it is possible that an equilibrium without interaction
between sectors is optimal for type-0 agents, but they will continue to trade with 1-sector
only due to inability of agents of 0-sector to collude and change the type of an equilibrium
by a joint action.
The equilibrium with all types of exchange is more fragile than the equilibrium with
only notes circulating between sectors in the sense that the instability threshold for the
former is much lower than that for the latter.
Numerical examples show that the economy can change the type of equilibrium due to
a small change of the trading friction, the level of ineﬀectiveness, the money supply or
size of note-issuing sector, and this may lead to the steep decline of the welfare of one of
the sectors or both, and the same happens in a variant of the model with taxation, due
to a small change of the level of taxes.3
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0.1. ￿Virtual Economy￿, Barter and Money Substitutes. Starting with Karpov
report (1997) (see Kuznetz (1998)) and papers Gaddy and Ickes (1998a, 1998b), it has
become a widely spread perception of the Russian Economy as the virtual economy with a
number of special features diﬀerent from both a normal market economy and a command
economy (see Guriev and Pospelov (1998), Ericson (1998), Gaddy and Ickes (1999), Guriev
and Ickes (1999), Ericson and Ickes (1999) and the bibliography there). In principle, any
transition economy diﬀers from both a normal market economy and a command economy,
but a word ￿transition￿ presupposes a passing stage of a transformation from a command
economy into a normal market one whereas the Russian Economy enjoys several stable
abnormal properties which do not exhibit a tendency to fade out. This means that the
Russian Economy may be in a new steady state, which rises the question of constructing
appropriate macroeconomic models.
One of the key features of the Russian Economy is the wide-spread usage of barter and
money substitutes (see e.g. empirical studies Aukutsionek (1994, 1998), Commander and
Mumssen (1998), Dolgopiatova (1998), Guriev and Ickes (1999)), which increases rather
than decreases as time goes by and is much more prominent than in other Transition
Economies (Carlin, Schaﬀer and Seabright (1999)).
Many explanations for these phenomena have been suggested. Ericson and Ickes (1999)
give the following list:
￿ insuﬃcient liquidity due to misplaced ￿monetarism￿ [Commander-Mumssen (1998),
etc.],
￿ irrationally high (controlled) monetary prices, especially for energy, inducing barter
as a means to eﬀect price cuts[Woodruﬀ (1998)];
￿ tax evasion [Hendley et al. (1998), Yakovlev (1999)];
￿ ineﬃcient monetary and credit systems [Poser (1998)];
￿ rent-seeking in monetized transactions by commercial and monetary intermedi-
aries, raising transactions costs above those of barter and quasi-monies [Guriev-
Pospelov (1998)];
￿ a lack of serious industrial restructuring, implying an inability to reproduce value
with the inherited con￿guration of technologies, production facilities, social obliga-
tions, etc. [Commander-Mumssen (1998), Gaddy-Ickes (1998b), Ericson (1998)].
They also observe that the common feature of all these explanations is that the prevalence
of barter and money substitutes is the result of either bad policy or bad structure. Bad
policy means (among other things) a very high level of taxation and the lack of liquidity,
and the usage of money substitutes and barter facilitate tax evasion and provide necessary
liquidity; bad structure means structural distortions in the economy which make many
enterprises unviable in the pure monetary economy, so that they have to resort to non-
monetary means of payment in order to survive. Ericson and Ickes (1999) construct a
partial equilibrium model which describes the interaction among the government, the
value-adding energy sector and a sector of loss-making enterprises. (For other approaches
to structural de￿ciencies of the Russian economy, see e.g. Polterovich (1998).)6
We look at the structural distortions in the Russian Economy from a diﬀerent perspec-
tive. Certainly, all the factors mentioned contribute to the wide-spread usage of barter
and money substitutes but a model we construct clearly demonstrates that even if we
assume that
￿ the agents in the economy are suﬃciently eﬀective so that they can survive in the
pure market economy;
￿ there is no taxation;
￿ there is no price control, and all the prices in the economy are determined endoge-
nously, as a result of optimizing behavior of individual agents;
￿ the money supply is suﬃcient by any reasonable standards,
money substitutes will appear in the economy simply because there exist agents in the
economy like Gazprom, UES who can issue universally accepted notes (IOU￿s).
As Gaddy and Ickes (1998a) points out, these IOU￿s typically circulate among chains
of enterprises short of cash and are eventually redeemed for gas, electricity etc. by some
of them. The usage of money substitutes is also facilitated by wide-spread stable busi-
ness networks and relations which help to organize barter2 chains which can use IOU￿s of
smaller agents. For empirical study of transactions conducted using non-monetary meth-
ods and instruments, see Guriev and Ickes (1999), Carlin, Schaﬀer and Seabright (1999)
and the bibliography there.
O u rm o d e la l s os h o w st h a ti fap a r to fa ne c o n o m yi sv e r yi n e ﬀective then it cannot
interact with an eﬀective part. All the money circulate in the latter, and the former can
survive only by using non-monetary transactions.
The endogenous appearance of money substitutes in an economy is an old issue in
Monetary Economics; we are interested in money and money substitutes as media of
exchange. In the next two Subsections, we discuss approaches to Monetary Economics,
w h i c hw ea r eg o i n gt ou s e .
0.2. Wallace￿s Dictum for Monetary Theory and a Random Matching Model
(Wallace (1998)). Walrasian equilibrium models implicitly assume an auctioneer, who
observing the goods suggested for trade chooses market clearing prices.
Hence, Walrasian equilibrium (WE) models have no role for a valued ￿at medium of
exchange, and since they always assume complete markets, all assets can be traded at
given prices in any circumstances. Therefore, all monetary theories have to depart from
WE. However, some monetary models (like money-in-the-utility/production-function, or
transaction costs models) depart only from Walrasian physical environment (agents, pref-
erences, resources, technology, information structure), while others (like trading-post
models or cash-in-advance models) depart from the equilibrium concept (rules govern-
ing interactions among agents). Finally, there is a class of models which depart both from
physical environment and equilibrium concepts of WE. One fraction of this class consists
of models with an absence of double coincidence of wants.
Monetary theories should not contain money as a primitive ￿ this is Wallace￿s dictum
for Monetary Theory. Models which assume real balances being arguments of utility or
production functions or impose cash-in-advance constraints do not satisfy this dictum.
2H e r et h ew o r d￿ b a r t e r ￿i su s e di nt h eR u s s i a ns e n s e :n o n - m o n e t a r yt r a n s a c t i o n7
The main reason is that they do not permit the assets￿ role in exchange to be endogenous.
This role is given to the assets in a model with no double coincidence of wants. Absence-of-
double-coincidence notion goes naturally with pairwise meetings of agents, therefore one
theory which satis￿es the dictum is a random matching model. Random meetings imply
that agents cannot choose whom to meet with, therefore they have to search. Monetary
search models show how ￿at currency can be valued, how endogenous commodity money
can arise; they can also discuss international monetary issues and address a variety of
other questions in monetary economics.
Random matching monetary models with indivisible goods and money study exchange
processes where, once agents meet, they exchange and part company. However, this
framework is not interesting enough because prices are given exogenously. One of the
ways to generalize these models is to make goods divisible, then the rate at which agents
exchange can be determined by bilateral bargaining. A strategic bargaining model is
due to Rubinstein and Wolinsky. This is an essentially dynamic model, however it is
possible to show that the equilibrium outcome of the strategic bargaining game can be
approximated by the generalized Nash bargaining solution which is inherently static, and
therefore tractable.
0.3. Inside and Outside Monies. One of the important questions addressed by mon-
etary economics is whether the private sector should be allowed to create money. One
concern, which holds for any economy, is what mechanisms could prevent a private mon-
etary system from printing too much money. Monetary models which use random match-
ing to represent a trading process, were introduced in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989; 1991;
1993); for subsequent developments, see Trejos and Wright (1995), Aiyagari, Wallace and
Wright (1995), Shi (1997), Wallace (1997) and review Wallace (1998). Models of this type
decentralize the trading frictions, abandon the Walrasian ￿ction and naturally generate
transaction demand for money.
Recently, there appeared several models, incorporating ￿inside money￿, where the label
￿inside￿ stands for ￿inside the private sector￿. The word ￿money￿ indicates the object
which is used as a tangible medium of exchange among the agents who recognize it as an
asset. In Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998; 1999) and Cavalcanti, Erosa, Temzelides (1998),
Williamson (1999) inside money is given a role both for credit and tangible medium of
exchange.
There is also a paper of Burdett, Trejos and Wright (1998), which introduces endoge-
nous money as a commodity (general good), which can be either consumed or stored and
used as a medium of exchange.
While the endogenous (commodity) money does not require any kind of pre commit-
ment, since the exchange, if it takes place, is always quid pro quo;m o d e l sw i t hi n s i d e
money need incentives of the agents to be taken into consideration. Though, originally,
credit was completely ruled out of the random matching framework, it is possible to intro-
duce some form of credit into monetary models by assuming that either people can commit
to future actions, or (complete or partial) public information about trading histories is
available, or both.8
The ￿rst paper to put partial public knowledge into the random matching setting, was
the one of Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998). In Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998; 1999) and
Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1998), it is assumed that a fraction of population -
a banking sector - has access to a private note-issuing technology, while the rest of the
economy - a non-banking sector - uses inside money as a medium of exchange. There
is a record keeping technology (clearing house) in the ￿rst sector and privacy-of-trading
histories in the second sector. There is also a note redemption technology inside the
banking sector which allows to discipline the amount of notes issued by the banking
sector.
Williamson (1999) explores a model with claims on banks as private money. Agents
can choose between investing into low or high-return projects, so there may exist welfare
dominated equilibria where banks hold low-return assets. Also it is shown that in case of
private information, private money may be subject to lemons problems.
In addition to the media of exchange produced in the private sector, all the above
models with inside and endogenous money, incorporate the exogenous provision by a
public sector of ￿at currency usually referred to as ￿outside or exogenous money￿. In
Burdett, Trejos and Wright (1998) and Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998; 1999), it is shown
that an equilibrium can be achieved in an economy with only endogenous or inside money
(respectively) in circulation.
The former paper also shows that if the supply of exogenous money is suﬃciently small,
both types of money coexist. The work of Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1998) deals
with the environment where inside and outside moneys circulate. Cavalcanti and Wallace
(1998; 1999) consider separately economies with inside and outside money.
Our model considers the case when inside and outside money coexist. We visualize
the note-issuing sector not as a banking sector, but as a coalition of large producers, like
Gas, Oil, Electricity companies, therefore we rule out the possibility of bankruptcy in a
sense that all resources are assumed to be unlimited. We assume both complete public
information and pre commitment in the banking sector, which makes it unavoidable to face
certain incentive compatibility constraints in the model. The punishment for deviation is
not the shutdown of the whole economy, like in Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998; 1999), but
the denunciation of a deviator, after which nobody accepts her notes.
Our agents are placed in a standard money-search environment of Kiyotaki and Wright,
in which diﬀerent people have diﬀerent preferences over a large number of diﬀerentiated
goods.
Our model combines more essential features than models in op.cit. The closest to our
paper are papers Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998, 1999), Burdett et al (1998) and Cavalcanti
et al (1998).
Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998, 1999) consider implementable allocations which arise
with inside and outside money separately, they do not examine coexistence of both kinds
of monies.
Burdett et al (1998) consider only commodity money as inside money, so they do not
have to take into account incentive compatibility constraints etc, since the trade if it takes
p l a c ei sa l w a y sq u i dp r oq u o .9
In Cavalcanti et al (1998), there is a ￿nite number of consumption goods and individ-
uals. Agents of type i can consume good i and produce good i + 1. A banking sector is
a real banking sector with clearing house, reserve keeping and possibility of being disso-
luted if notes redeemed exceeds reserve balance. Coexistence of private and government
money is studied only for the case of discount factor close to 1, but neither analytical
results for endogenous variables are obtained nor the case of agents of diﬀerent levels of
ineﬀectiveness is studied (the last remark concerns other papers as well).
0.4. A Monetary Model for the Virtual Economy: A General Set-Up. We are
going to construct a tractable benchmark model, so that an economy enjoys only basic
features of the Virtual Economy, which are necessary and suﬃcient for a reproduction of
an eﬀect of wide-spread usage of money substitutes. The reader may regard some of our
a s s u m p t i o n sa so v e r - s i m p l i ￿cations, but as she will see below this over-simpli￿ed model
is rather complicated already, and exhibit a number of interesting features even in this
simple set-up. Further, the model is constructed in such a way that it can be modi￿ed
in many directions in order to incorporate additional features of the reality, and when
convenient, we will indicate how it can be done.
The economy consists of two sectors:
￿ as e c t o ro fe ﬀective new or restructured and privatized ￿rms (0-sector), and
￿ a sector of old, mainly non-restructured and ineﬀective ￿rms (1-sector), who can
collude and issue universally accepted notes.
A note may circulate among type-0 agents (agents of 0-sector), and eventually one of them
redeems it for a good an agent of 1-sector produces. Since agents of 1-sector collude, they
agree on conditions for note-issuing and redemption and on the amount they produce
to each other in meetings inside 1-sector. These conditions and amount are chosen to
maximize the welfare of 1-sector, given optimizing behavior of agents of 0-sector. The
usage of money is decided by each agent, and the interaction of all these optimizing
actions results in endogenously determined trading strategies, prices, the amount of notes
in circulation and the distribution of the money between sectors.
We assume that agents are heterogeneous, and we specify their preferences and produc-
tion opportunities so that in any meeting, there is no double coincidence of wants. This
naturally generates the demand for media of exchange.
In the real counterpart of our model economy, notes of such large ￿r m sa sG a z p r o m
and UES are accepted because these ￿rms are large and omnipresent, and notes of smaller
￿rms can circulate due to the existence of well-established connections and barter chains,
which play the role of the clearing house in search-theoretical models with the banking
sector; the redemption of IOU￿s for goods is wide-spread in the Russian Economy, as
was mentioned above. So far, our assumptions agree with the reality, except for the fact
that the real old sector consists of two subsectors with essentially diﬀerent production
properties ￿ a value adding energy subsector (Gazprom, UES and Oil companies), and
low/negative value adding (loss making) old manufacturing sector. Thus, a more realistic
model should describe an economy with three sectors:
￿ 0-sector (the same as in our model);10
￿ 1-sector (a note-issuing sector of relatively eﬃcient colluding agents);
￿ 2-sector (non-restructured ineﬀective old manufacturing enterprises).
By analogy with our results for a two-sector economy, we expect that if 2-sector is
suﬃciently ineﬀective then in an extended version of our model with 3 sectors, in an
equilibrium, it is non-optimal for 1-and 2-sectors to use money in mutual trades. If we
make an assumption that the eﬀective 0-sector does not consume inferior goods produced
by 2-sector or 2-sector is so ineﬀective that it is non-optimal for 0-sector to trade with
2-sector on conditions acceptable for 2-sector, then 0-sector and 2-sector do not trade.
Finally, if we assume that type-1 agents are suﬃciently eﬀective then type-0 agents and
type-1 agents have an incentive to trade, and if type-1 agents can trade with type-0 agents
independently of trades with 2-sector (so that if type-1 agents are production constrained,
this constraint aﬀects only trades with 2-sector, not 0-sector), then our model completely
determines optimal trading strategies, equilibrium prices, volume of notes in circulation
and distribution of money between 0-sector and 1-sector in an equilibrium.
After that we can take these prices, etc., as exogenous for a model describing relations
between 1-sector and 2-sector. Notice that Ericson and Ickes (1999) construct a partial
equilibrium model describing interaction between a value-adding sector and loss-making
one, with the exogenously given the government policy, which facilitate the transfer of
value from 1-sector to 2-sector and explain the appearance of barter and money substitutes
in trades between 1-sector and 2-sector.
Thus, our model and Ericson and Ickes (1999) model taken together can give the whole
picture. Notice, that for some parameters￿ values, our model demonstrates the additional
transfer of value: from 0-sector to 1-sector.
The agreed rules for note-issuing, redemption and production inside 1-sector are abso-
lutely natural if we assume that agents of 1-sector are branches of only one large ￿rm as
Gazprom. More realistic model should include several sectors with properties of 1-sector;
in principle, our model can be tractable in this more general set-up.
In the framework of a consistent (from the point of view of Monetary Theory) approach,
the next step to the reality can be taken if, in addition, we allow the appearance of notes
issued by ineﬀective and unreliable agents and intermediaries, who enforce the redemption
of these notes in separate ￿islands￿ of the ineﬀective sector ￿ at a cost paid by other
ineﬀective agents.
We plan to construct the corresponding models in the future.
0.5. Pairwise Meetings, Participation Constraints and Incentive Compatibility
Constraints. Agents meet pairwise and at random, and in each meeting, an individual
decision: to trade or not to trade, and how much good to produce for a unit of money or
a note, is the result of the optimizing behavior of individual agents, with the exceptions
of note-issuing rules imposed on type-1 agents by the ￿social planner￿ of 1-sector.
The optimizing behavior of individual agents is described by participation constraints.
The rules imposed by the ￿social planner￿ may be non-optimal on an individual level (for
instance, it is not individually optimal to redeem a note issued by another agent), and in
order that the deviation be non-optimal on the individual level, it is necessary that the
gain from a deviation be less than the gain from obeying the rules. After formalizing,11
we obtain a group of incentive compatibility constraints. Both groups of constraints are
d e r i v e di nS e c t i o n1 .
0.6. Characteristic Parameters and Trading Friction. Agents discount the future
at the rate r>0, and an agent meets other agents at random according to the Poisson
process with the parameter α > 0. Since one is free to choose a unit of time, one may
assume that α = 1 and simplify some formulas in the model. The same simpli￿cation
obtains when one introduces the normalized discount rate ρ = r/α, as one routinely does
in random-matching models.
We consider agents with idiosyncratic tastes, so that for a given agent, only a fraction
x∗ of agents can produce goods which she consumes. This means that only a fraction x∗
of all meetings can provide an opportunity to trade. In eﬀect, this is the same as if the
Poisson rate of arrival is multiplied by x∗, and the normalized discount rate is divided by
x∗. We obtain a fraction h = ρ/x∗,w h i c hw ec a l lthe trading friction. If we choose a unit
of time so that r =1 ,t h e n1 /h is the Poisson rate of arrival of partners with whom an
agents may wish to trade.
The smaller h,t h em o r ee ﬀective is the trading process.
Notice that for unrestructured ￿rms, both α and x∗ are small: such ￿rms can neither
aﬀord to actively look for trading partners, since this is costly, nor diversify their produc-
tion good and make it desirable for a large fraction of agents in an economy. Hence, for
unrestructured ￿rms, h is larger than for non-restructured ones.
Notice the importance of the value of h for a pattern of exchange observed in an
equilibrium. If h is small, an agent can be patient, so that when a trading partner
oﬀers rather unfavorable conditions, she can walk away and wait for a better trading
opportunity to arrive, but if h is large, then in eﬀect, agents have to heavily discount the
future and accept small amounts of good for a unit of money, and produce for a unit of
an inferior mean of exchange; note-issuing agents can issue more notes since the moment
of redemption is in the distant future.
The interaction of these factors leads to an economy with very bad properties ￿ many
notes in circulation and small amount of good produced for both a note and a unit of
money, and according to the argument above, this situation is expected in an economy
with a large fraction of non-restructured ￿rms.
The well-known eﬀect in the Game Theory is the diﬃculty in supporting cooperation
when the discount factor is small and agents heavily discount the future. The similar
situation in our model arises when h is large: the incentives to deviate become large and
some of incentive compatibility constraints become binding (we constructed such equilibria
in Boyarchenko and Levendorski￿ i (1999) for an economy with only notes in circulation,
and similar equilibria can be constructed when both notes and money circulate). In the
present paper, we consider mainly the case of small h, and prove that in this case, all the
incentive compatibility constraints are non-binding.
0.7. Exogenous and Endogenous Parameters. The list of exogenous parameters of
our model consists of r,α,x ∗, the amount of the money in the economy, M,t h es i z e
of the note-issuing sector, and parameters characterizing utility functions and marginal
production cost of agents.12
In order that agents of 0- and 1-sector diﬀer, we have to assume that they have con-
sumption technologies with diﬀerent levels of eﬀectiveness and/or diﬀerent marginal pro-
duction costs. We choose them to have diﬀerent marginal production costs; the case of
consumption technologies with diﬀerent levels of eﬀectiveness can be reduced to the case
of diﬀerent marginal production costs by a change of variables.
The trading strategies of agents, amounts of good produced for a unit of money and a
note in meetings of diﬀerent types, note-issuing rules, the amount of notes in circulation
and the distribution of money between sectors are determined endogenously as the result
of optimal choices of agents of an economy and a ￿social planner￿ of a colluding sector.
0.8. Stationary Equilibria, Balance Equations and Bellman￿s Equations. We
consider only stationary equilibria, hence the volume of notes in circulation, the distri-
bution of money between sectors, the ￿ows of notes and money between sectors must be
independent of time. This requirement leads to a group of the balance equations. Simi-
larly, the value function of an agent in a given state must be time-independent, and we
obtain a group of the stationary Bellman￿s equations.
0.9. Types of Equilibria. We consider an economy with non-zero level of money supply,
and we mainly concentrate on cases when there are notes in circulation as well. The case
of only notes in circulation was treated in Boyarchenko and Levendorski￿ i (1999), and pure
monetary equilibria in Boyarchenko (1999) (for more general utility functions and types
of heterogeneity of agents than here).
0.9.1. Splitted Economies. Possible pure monetary equilibria in our case are equilibria
when there is no trade between sectors, the economy splits into two disjoint economies,
and all the money circulate inside 0-sector. We call them type 0M equilibria, with 0
indicating the number of types of exchange between sectors, and M stresses the fact that
there is money in circulation.
A splitted economy may arise due to our assumptions that 1) there are only two types
of agents in an economy; and 2) there is no constraint on consumption tuples so that a
type-0 agent can substitute goods type-0 agents produce for goods type-1 agents do. If
they cannot, certain amount of trade between sectors remains in any case; on the formal
level, we must introduce an additional constraint into our model, and this constraint is
binding when the present more simple model yield a splitted economy. If there are many
levels of eﬀectiveness, there may be as groups of sectors with no exchange among them
(petty manufacturers do not buy brand-name computers, and Compaq does not need
goods these manufacturers produce) as groups of sectors who trade among themselves.
The eﬀect of splitting is demonstrated in Boyarchenko (1999) for the case of pure
monetary economy with agents of many levels of eﬀectiveness; since in her model there are
neither inside money nor collusion, starting with certain level of ineﬀectiveness, ineﬀective
agents are unable to trade at all.
Notice that an economy which splits from the point of view of non-existence of sta-
tionary steady states with trade between sectors may have non-stationary steady states
￿ cycles or more complex forms ￿ with trade between sectors. The study of such non-
stationary equilibria goes beyond the scope of the present paper.13
0.9.2. Economies with Trades between Sectors. Properties of equilibria and equilibria
speci￿cation depend on a note-issuing rule, which the note-issuing sector uses: the sector
may ￿nd it optimal to
￿ restrict issue of notes, so that an agent has no right to issue notes in some cases
when it is optimal on an individual level;
￿ allow for agents to print notes if and only if this is optimal on the individual level;
￿ print too many notes, more than it is optimal on an individual level, in order that
the stability be preserved.
It is interesting that depending on values of parameters, characterizing the economy (such
as the trading friction, the degree of specialization in consumption, and the level of ineﬀec-
tiveness), all possible types of equilibria can be realized (we have shown it in Boyarchenko
and Levendorski￿ i (1999) for the case of an economy with only notes in circulation), but
when the friction vanishes, many equilibria disappear as well. In particular, if agents are
not very picky, an ineﬀective sector rather ineﬀective, and the friction is small, then only
type-0M equilibria are possible.
On the other hand, if the trading friction is suﬃciently large then there may exist an
equilibrium where eﬀective type-0 agents continue to trade with very ineﬀective type-1
agents.
Thus, a possible way for ineﬀective sector to preserve itself is to increase the trading
friction, i.e. make the infrastructure worse (by using political connections, say), but if
a policy maker willing to improve the economy invests in the trading infrastructure at
the expense of the eﬀectiveness of the production sector, the economy loses stability and
splits into two disjoint economies, which may cause huge welfare losses3
If the trading friction is small, 1-sector is suﬃciently eﬀective and agents are not very
picky (x∗ >> h), there may exist two types of equilibria:
￿ type-IM equilibria (only notes circulate between sectors), and
￿ type-IIM equilibria (both money and notes circulate between sectors).
In both cases, agents of type 0 use both money and notes in trades inside 0-sector.
Thus, 0, I(= 1) and II(= 2) indicate the number of diﬀerent types of trades between
sectors in an equilibrium of a given type.
Type IM equilibrium can be perceived as too unrealistic, but it provides a good ap-
proximation to more realistic situations when 1-sector needs some in￿ow of money to pay
taxes or acquire goods produced by a fraction of agents who do not accept notes at any
circumstances, ￿ if the tax level is not very high and the fraction of such agents is not
very large. One can also generalize our model and treat this situation explicitly.
When the trading friction vanishes, the welfare of the note-issuing sector becomes larger
in a type-IM equilibrium if IM and IIM equilibria can coexist. Thus, 1-sector would always
choose not to use money at all if the former does not need the latter for some exogenous
purposes (to pay taxes, for instance). If the trading friction is not very small, the money
supply is rather large, and 1-sector is fairly eﬀective, then the usage of money becomes
optimal for 1-sector.
3cf. Castanheira and Roland (1995) for general equilibrium analysis of the optimal speed of Transition14
At the same time, at low levels of the money supply, its increase is good for eﬀective
agents. Similarly, the welfare of agents of diﬀerent types can move in opposite directions as
other exogenous parameters of an economy change. This means that the total welfare for
such an economy is an ill-de￿ned concept, and one has to analyze the welfare of diﬀerent
types of agents separately.
A type of an equilibrium optimal for 1-sector may be optimal for the eﬀective 0-sector,
and may be non-optimal. In the last case, the trade between sectors can be preserved
only due to inability of agents of 0-sector to collude. Numerical examples illustrate how
it can happen: when one of the parameters of the model, e.g. the money supply or the
size of note-issuing sector, changes, an economy can move from a region where a type-IIM
equilibrium, say, was optimal for both sectors, into a region where a type-IIM equilibrium
continues to be optimal for 1-sector (so the latter does preserve the former) but for 0-
sector, it becomes optimal not to trade with 1-sector at all. Still, type-0 agents cannot
collude and change the type of the equilibrium, and if a policy maker wishes to stop
circulation of notes, she has to introduce some additional obstacles which would prevent
an economy from using them; notes will continue to circulate in an economy, if it is left
alone.
¿From the point of view of our model, the most natural thing to do is the simultaneous
￿ increase of the money supply;
￿ demonopolization of note-issuing large ￿rms, like Gazprom and UES ￿ notes of
smaller ￿rms are less acceptable, and
￿ heavy taxation of intermediaries involved in organizing of barter chains.
Of course, political feasibility of this program is questionable, to say the least.
0.10. Optimal Level of Money Supply and Capital Flight. For type-IM equilibria,
we show that for an eﬀective 1-sector, an optimal money supply in the economy is zero,
and for larger levels of the ineﬀectiveness, there is an optimal positive level of the money
supply. The ￿rst fact has a clear economic interpretation: a note-issuing sector can
issue notes on more favorable condition if notes is the only mean of exchange, but an
explanation of the second fact ￿ a positive optimal level of the money supply ￿ is more
subtle. Even in a non-monetary economy, a symmetric steady state does not exist if the
ineﬀectiveness is large: an eﬀective type-0 agent can obtain a large amount of good for
a note when she meets another type-0 agent, and if the trading friction is small, she can
be patient and not accept essentially smaller amount of good from type-1 agents, but if
the latter are very ineﬀective, they cannot produce that much, and prefer not to trade
with 0-sector at all (we proved it in Boyarchenko and Levendorski￿ i (1999)), and the same
eﬀect is observed when money are scarce. Thus, if 1-sector is rather ineﬀective, then a
non-zero level of the money supply is needed to prevent the economy from splitting. An
increase of the money supply plays a stabilizing role because it makes a unit of money
and a note less valuable, and at the same time, the relative value of a note w.r.t. a unit
of money increases. At some level of the money supply, the note issuing becomes optimal
for 1-sector, on conditions acceptable for agents of 0-sector.
Notice that if 1-sector is not very ineﬀective, an optimal money supply from the its
point of view is less that that from the point of view of 0-sector.15
If the existing money supply is at or above an optimal level (from the point of view
of 1-sector), there is a strong incentive for 1-sector to transfer new money out of the
economy, should the new money arrive. This observation may provide a new explanation
for the capital ￿ight. The more eﬀective 1-sector, the lower is the optimal amount of the
money in the economy for this sector, hence the larger is the incentive for capital ￿ight.
It means, in particular, that
the investment in the energy sector (a core of the sector of colluding agents) at the
expense of restructured enterprises of 0-sector facilitates the capital ￿ight.
0.11. Instability Index and Instability Threshold. We show that the economy does
not split if and only if the instability index = the product of the level of ineﬀectiveness,
the defect of the money supply and the inverse of trading friction does not cross a certain
instability threshold.T h u s , i f t h e i n e ﬀectiveness is large, large trading friction and/or
money supply are needed to preserve the trade between sectors.
Similarly, if a policy maker invests in the trading infrastructure (means of communica-
tions, etc.), which increases the Poisson rate of arrival of trading partners and decreases
the trading friction, without investment in the ineﬀective 1-sector, or decreases the money
supply, than the economy loses stability and splits, but if 1-sector is as eﬀective as 0-sector,
then the sectors continue to trade for all values of the trading friction.
This observation leads to a conjecture on 3-sector variant of our model made in Sub-
section 0.4: an ineﬀective 2-sector cannot trade with an eﬀective 0-sector, but if 1-sector
is suﬃciently eﬀective, it continues to trade with 0-sector.
The ￿nal remark on stability issues: numerical examples show that the economy can
lose stability due to a small change of the money supply or size of note-issuing sector;
similarly, this can happen in an analogous model with taxation, due to not large increase
of taxes. This may lead to a steep decline of the welfare of one of the sectors or both of
them.16
1. Model Specification
1.1. Fit the First (Preferences, Production and Meeting technology). Consider
an economy with a continuum of in￿nitely lived agents, the size of population being
normalized to one. Time is continuous. The agents discount the future at the rate r>0.
Agents are indexed by points on a circle of circumference two. There is also a continuum
of goods/services indexed by points on the same circle. The agents have idiosyncratic
tastes for goods: there exists x∗ ∈ (0,1/2) such that if the distance between an agent and
her favorite good is greater than x∗ then the former enjoys 0 utility from consuming any
amount of the latter, and if the distance is less than or equal to x∗ then the agent enjoys
utility u(q)f r o mc o n s u m i n gq units of the good. This implies, in particular that x∗ is the
probability that an agent will like a certain good.
We assume that u enjoys standard properties:
u is smooth, increasing and concave, and satis￿es the Inada conditions.
To acquire goods, agents search in a productive sector. Suppose that search is costless
and production is instantaneous. Each production opportunity yields to an agent i some
amount of a perfectly divisible good j at a ￿xed distance z,2 x∗ <z<2−2x∗,c l o c k w i s e
from i.
Due to properties of the preferences and production opportunities, agents do not con-
sume their own output, so they have to trade it in the exchange sector. Trading partners
arrive according to a Poisson process with the constant rate α. In other words, we restrict
our consideration to a CRS meeting technology. We consider the case when the distance
between partners in a meeting is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution U[0,1]. It
is clear that the speci￿cation of preferences and production opportunities rules out the
double coincidence of wants. Thus, we have either single or no coincidence of wants, and
the probability of single coincidence of wants is x∗.
Goods are perishable, so if an agent decides to acquire a good, she has to consume it
immediately.
1.2. Fit the Second (Means of exchange and Types of agents). There is an ex-
ogenous money supply M ∈ (0,1). Money is indivisible, and an agent can carry either
1 unit of money or none. These assumptions essentially simplify the study of the model,
and still allow us to endogenize prices as inverses to amounts of good produced for a unit
of money.
We rule out M = 0, since the economy is non-monetary then, and M =1m e a n st h a t
the money cannot be used for transaction purposes, since everybody has a unit of money
and cannot ￿nd a seller.
Agents may issue indivisible and perfectly storable promissory notes (IOU￿s). A fraction
of agents - we call them type-1 agents (and the others - type-0 agents) - issue notes, which
are distinguishable in a sense that no counterfeiting is possible, and collude in the following
sense:
(i) they agree on a rule for note-issuing and an amount of good, qN,t ob er e d e e m e df o r
any type-1 note (i.e. a note issued by any type-1 agent);17
(ii) they agree not to use means of exchange when they trade with each other, and ￿x
q1, the level of production for a trade between two type-1 agents in the case of single
coincidence of wants;
(iii) each type-1 agent signs a note she issues and writes a date of issue on it;
(iv) they record information about every type-1 agent and spread this information
among themselves;
(v) if a type-1 agent deviates from any of the agreed rules, the other type-1 agents make
publicly known that they regard notes issued by a deviator after this moment as notes
issued by any type-0 agent and do not redeem them;
(vi) they choose the rule and quantities qN and q1 in (i) and (ii) so that to maximize the
welfare of type-1 agents subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (which ensure
that a deviation is not optimal).
The type of the rule deserves a special comment. On an individual level, a type-1 agent
would not issue a note unless she enjoys a positive utility from consumption of a given
good, i.e. an individual agent issues a note with probability x∗. However, a choice of the
rule aﬀects all endogenous parameters of the economy and the welfare of type-1 agents.
Thus, it may be optimal to issue a note with probability x1 >x ∗ in order to increase
the amount of liquidity in the economy and make the outside money less valuable; in this
case, ￿the social planner￿ of 1-sector (a sector of type-1 agents) obliges a type-1 agent to
issue a note even if the agent does not like the good. It may also be optimal to issue a
note with probability x1 <x ∗ in order to make notes more scarce, increase the transaction
value of a note, and receive more goods in exchange for a note. In this case, ￿the social
planner￿ of 1-sector forbids to issue a note in some cases even if an agent likes a good.
So a rule for note-printing, as far as the mathematical structure of the model is con-
cerned, is as follows:
￿ (for the case x1 ≤ x∗) ￿never issue a note if the distance of the good from your
favorite one z>x ∗,a n di fz ≤ x∗, issue a note with a probability x1/x∗￿;
￿ (for the case x1 >x ∗)￿ i fz>x ∗, issue a note with a probability (x1−x∗)/(1−x∗)￿.
When a buyer is of type 1 and has to issue a note even when she does not like the good,
we also use the label ￿single coincidence meeting￿.
Notes of type-0 agents are distinguishable one from another so that neither agent except
for an agent i of type 0 is in any sense under obligation to redeem a note issued by the
latter. Hence, each note will be redeemed with 0 probability, and in any symmetric
equilibria, which we are going to consider, it cannot be optimal for anyone to accept a
type-0 note. Thus, we may assume that type-0 notes do not circulate at all, and hereafter,
we call type-1 notes simply ￿notes￿.
We assume that any type-0 agent can carry either 1 unit of money or a note or none
of these; a type-1 agent can carry 1 or 0 units of money.
Types 1 and 0 agents also diﬀer in their production: type-0 agents may be endowed with
better production opportunities, so that they suﬀer lower disutility (cost) of production
per unit of good. Namely, we set the marginal cost 1 for a type-0 agent, and k ≥ 1 for a
type-1 agent.18
The motivation is that in the Russian economy, it is a sector of old, mainly unre-
structured enterprises which manages to survive due to collusion, informal networks and
widespread usage of IOU￿s.
1.3. Fit the Third (States of agents, Single-coincidence-of-wants-meetings and
Participation Constraints). Each type-0 agent can be in three states:
￿ a note holder (a buyer carrying a note);
￿ a type-0 money holder (a buyer with a unit of money);
￿ at y p e - 0s e l l e r .
We denote by V 0
N,V0
m,V0
s the value functions of an agent in these states.
A type-1 agent can be in two states:
￿ a type-1 money holder (a type-1 agent with a unit of money);
￿ a type-1 agent without money.
The corresponding value functions are denoted by V 1
m and V 1, respectively.
We assume that a buyer has a bargaining power which enables her to extract all seller￿s
surplus from trade. More precisely, we determine a quantity produced in each round of
trade as a generalized Nash bargaining solution, which satis￿es
q = argmax[u(q)+Vs − Vb]
θ[Vb − kq − Vs]
1−θ,
where Vs ∈ {V 0
s ,V1},V b ∈ {V 0
N,V0
m,V1
m} are value functions of a seller and a buyer
respectively; and θ is the bargaining power of a buyer. Due to the assumption above,
buyers have absolute bargaining power in this model, i.e. θ = 1. This also means that if a
trade occurs, a seller produces her ￿reservation quantity￿, i.e. the quantity which makes
her indiﬀerent between an alternative: produce or not produce.
If a seller and/or buyer ￿nd it optimal not to trade, both leave the meeting remaining
in the same state as before the meeting.
When two agents of type-0 meet, they cannot trade unless the buyer has either a note
or a unit of money, the other has neither, and the buyer wants to consume the production
good of the seller.
Suppose, the buyer carries a note. Evidently, the seller does not produce if she is worse






s − q0 =0 . (1.1)
The note holder decides whether to spend her note or not given the amount of good the
seller agrees to produce. We denote by x0 the probability with which a type-0 buyer
spends her note in a meeting with a type-0 seller. We assume that the buyer trades if she
is not worse oﬀ after the trade, therefore x0 is either 0 or x∗ and satis￿es





on the strength of (1.1), this is equivalent to
x0 = x∗ ⇐⇒ u(q0) ≥ q0. (1.2)19
Now, let the buyer be a type-0 money holder. The seller does not produce if she is worse
oﬀ after the trade, therefore in exchange for a unit of money, a type-0 seller produces an





s − qm0 =0 . (1.3)
The money holder decides whether to spend her unit of money or not given the amount of
good the seller agrees to produce. We denote by xm0 the probability with which a type-0
money holder spends her money in a meeting with a type-0 seller. We assume that the
buyer trades if she is not worse oﬀ after the trade, therefore xm0 is either 0 or x∗ and
satis￿es





on the strength of (1.3), this is equivalent to
xm0 = x∗ ⇐⇒ u(qm0) ≥ qm0. (1.4)
Now suppose that two agents of diﬀerent types meet. We have to consider two cases:
(i) type-0 agent is a buyer, type-1 agent is a seller;
(ii) type-0 agent is a seller, type-1 agent is a buyer.
In the ￿rst case, if the type-0 agent has a unit of money, and the type-1 agent has no
money, the former decides whether to spend her unit of money or not, given the maximal




1 − kqm1 =0 . (1.5)
We denote the probability of acquiring a good for money by xm; assuming that the buyer
spends her money if she is not worse oﬀ after the trade, we conclude that xm is either 0
or x∗,a n d





By taking into account (1.3), we obtain
xm = x∗ ⇐⇒ u(qm1) ≥ qm0. (1.6)
If the type-0 agent has a note, she takes into account the amount qN, which type-1 agents
have agreed to produce while redeeming a note, and decides, whether to spend her note
or not. We denote the probability of returning a note for redemption by xN;i ti se q u a l
x∗, if the buyer decides to spend her note ever, and 0 otherwise.
Thus, we must have (1.1) and
xN = x∗ ⇐⇒ u(qN) ≥ q0. (1.7)
In the second case, a trade cannot take place unless the type-0 agent carries neither
notes nor money. Suppose, the buyer has no money. The maximum amount, q0,w h i c h
the seller agrees to produce for a note, is given by (1.1), and the buyer issues a note in
exchange with probability x1, following the rule assigned by the ￿social planner￿.
If the type-1 agent has a unit of money, her decision rule depends on the note-issuing
rule x1.
If the assigned probability of note-issuing x1 ≤ x∗,a n dz>x ∗, the buyer walks away.
If z ≤ x∗,s h e￿rst decides whether to spend her money or not, and the decision depends
on z.I fz ≤ x1, then the buyer spends her money with probability xm1.I ti se q u a lt o020
provided the agent decides not to pay with the money and issues a note instead (given
she gets q0 in exchange), and x1 otherwise (given she gets qm0 in exchange). Thus,




(if the agent spends her money, she is not worse oﬀ than when she pays with a note),
which is equivalent to
xm1 = x1 ⇐⇒ u(qm0) − kqm1 ≥ u(q0), (1.8)
on the strength of (1.5); and
xm1 =0&z ≤ x1 ⇒ the agent issues a note. (1.9)
If x1 <z≤ x∗, then the probability of spending money is denoted by x
+
m1.I ti se q u a l
to 0 if the buyer decides to walk away, and x∗ − x1 otherwise. Thus,
x
+








m1 = x∗ − x1 ⇐⇒ u(qm0) − kqm1 ≥ 0. (1.10)
Now consider the case when the socially optimal (for 1-sector) probability of note-
issuing x1 >x ∗.I fz ≤ x∗, the buyer ￿rst decides whether to spend her money or not.
The probability of spending money is denoted by xm1; it is equal to 0 if the agent decides
not to pay with the money and issues a note instead, and x∗ otherwise:




which is equivalent to
xm1 = x1 ⇐⇒ u(qm0) − kqm1 ≥ u(q0), (1.11)
on the strength of (1.5); and
xm1 =0&z ≤ x∗ or x∗ <z≤ x1 ⇒ the agent issues a note. (1.12)
Finally, when type-1 agents meet, the seller produces q1, the agreed amount of good,




and q1 is maximal among those for which incentive compatibility constraints below are
satis￿ed.
1.4. Fit the Fourth (Incentive compatibility constraints). Type-0 agents face no
incentive compatibility constraints, since they make only individual decisions and do not
collude, whereas colluding type-1 agents face three such constraints, when they carry a
unit of money, and three similar constraints when they have no money. These constraints
ensure that an agent ￿nds it optimal on an individual level to obey the rules imposed by
a ￿social planner￿ of 1-sector. If these constraints are violated, individually optimizing
agents will defect, and the collusion of type-1 agents will become impossible.21
Denote by Vs (Vm) the value of a type-1 agent without (with) a unit of money who is
deprived of the privilege of issuing universally accepted notes. The ￿r s tp a i ro fi n c e n t i v e
compatibility constraints is obvious and expresses the fact that the payoﬀ t oat y p e - 1
agent, when she redeems a note, is not worse than the gain from the failure to do so:
V
1 ≥ kqN + Vs. (1.14)
V
1
m ≥ kqN + Vm. (1.15)
Secondly, we need a pair of non-defection conditions for the inside exchange among type-1
agents, which states that there should be no positive gain from the failure to produce q1
whenever required: V 1 ≥ kq1 + Vs and V 1
m ≥ kq1 + Vm. Hence,




m − Vm}, (1.16)
where q∗ solves (1.13).
The last group of constraints are conditions of non-defection from the assigned prob-
ability of note-issuing x1.I f x1 = x∗, an individually optimal probability, there is no
incentive to deviate. If x1 <x ∗, and a type-1 agent issues a note in violation of this
condition, she derives an additional instantaneous utility u(q0) but her continuation value
becomes Vs (if she has no money) or Vm (if she carries a unit of money). Hence,




m ≥ u(q0)+Vm, (1.17)




m ≥ Vm. (1.18)
Note that
0 ≤ Vs ≤ V
0
s , (1.19)
since the marginal production cost for type-0 agents is 1, and for type-1 agents, it is k ≥ 1;
Vs ≥ 0, since the autarky gives 0 for a defector.
When a defector with a unit of money trades, she extracts the same surplus as a type-0
agent with a unit of money, and after that the former has a continuation value Vm,a n d
the latter ￿ V 0




1.5. Fit the Fifth (Stationary equilibria). Consider a tuple
g = {M0,M 1,N,x 0,x 1,x N,x m0,x m,x m1,x
+
m1,q 0,q 1,q N,q m0,q m1,V1}.
We call it a stationary equilibrium if and only if the following ￿ve conditions are met
(i) it is rational for an individual agent to behave in the same way as an average
agent, therefore we may use the same letter to denote an individual variable and the
corresponding aggregate variable;
(ii) probabilities x0,x N,x m0,x m,x m1,x
+
m1 of spending a unit of a medium of exchange
in a round of trade are either 0 or positive, and satisfy optimality conditions (1.2), (1.4),
(1.6), (1.7), (1.8) and (1.10) in the case of note-issuing with probability below or the
same as the individually optimal one; in the case of note-issuing with probability above22




(iii) x1 ∈ [0,1], and N,M0,M 1,q 0,q 1,q N,q m0,q m1,V1 are non-negative;
(iv) all endogenous variables are time-independent.
In the next two Subsections, we will deduce from the stationarity condition
balance equations (1.22), (1.23) and (1.24),
Bellman￿s equations (1.15)￿(1.29),
and rewrite incentive compatibility constraints in the form (1.30)￿(1.34);
(v) type-1 agents choose x1, q1 and qN in order to maximize their welfare
W =( 1− M1)V
1 + M1V
1




1.6. Fit the Sixth (Balance equations). Denote by pj af r a c t i o no ft y p e - ja g e n t s
(j =0 ,1), by N the proportion of type-0 agents carrying notes, and by p0M0 and p1M1
denote fractions of the aggregate money supply, M, which belong to type-0 and type-1
agents, respectively. Clearly,
p0 + p1 =1 , (1.21)
and
p0M0 + p1M1 = M (1.22)
(the money neither arrives nor disappear).
The remaining two balance equations state that in a steady state, the ￿ow of notes
being issued must equal to the ￿ow of notes being destroyed, and the ￿ow of money from
1-sector to 0-sector is equal to the ￿ow in opposite direction.
In the case when the socially optimal probability of note-issuing is not higher than the
individually optimal one,
the ￿ow of notes being issued is equal to
p0(1 − N − M0)p1{(1 − M1)x1 + M1(x1 − xm1)};
the ￿ow of notes being destroyed is equal to p0Np1xN;
the in￿ow of money into 1-sector is equal to p0M0xmp1(1 − M1);
the out￿ow of money from 1-sector is equal to
p0(1 − M0 − N)p1M1(xm1 + x
+
m1);
and the balance equations are
(1 − N − M0)(x1 − M1xm1)=NxN;( 1 . 2 3 )
M0xm(1 − M1)=( 1− M0 − N)M1(xm1 + x
+
m1). (1.24)
(In deriving (1.23) and (1.24), we have used conditions 0 <M ,p 0 > 0,p 1 > 0, which
ensure that the model is monetary and there are two sectors in the economy).
In the case when the assigned probability of note-issuing is higher than that at the
individual level,23
the ￿ows of notes being issued and destroyed, and the in￿ow of money into 1-sector are
given by the same formulas as above, but
the out￿ow of money from 1-sector is equal to
p0(1 − M0 − N)p1M1xm1.
Thus, the balance equation for notes is the same equation (1.23) (with xm1 having a
diﬀerent meaning, though), and if we introduce x
+
m1 = 0 in the case of the note-issuing
above the individually optimal level, then the balance equation for money is the same
equation (1.24).
We use the same agreement about x
+
m1 in the next subsection.
1.7. Fit the Seventh (Bellman￿s equations for stationary equilibria). We assume
that it is rational for an individual agent to behave in the same way as an average agent,
and therefore we may use the same letter to denote an aggregate variable and the corre-
sponding individual variable.
Let ρ = r/α be a normalized discount rate. Assume that the economy is in a steady
state, and consider a type-0 seller. During a small time interval ∆t, she meets someone
with the probability 1 − e−α∆t. Conditioned on a meeting having taken place,
1) with the probability p0Nx0, she meets a type-0 note-holder, who likes her good. In
the result of such a meeting, she produces, suﬀers a production cost q0,a n db e c o m e sa
note-holder with the value function V 0
N. Thus, her net gain is V 0
N − V 0
s − q0,a n dt h e











2) with the probability p0M0xm0, she meets a type-0 money holder, who likes her good.
In the result of such a meeting, she produces, suﬀers a production cost qm0, and becomes
a type-0 money-holder with the value function V 0
m. Thus, her net gain is V 0
m − V 0
s − qm0,











3) with the probability p1M1(xm1 + x
+
m1), she meets a type-1 money holder, who likes
her good and wants to pay with money. In the result of such a meeting, she produces,
suﬀers a production cost qm0, and becomes a type-0 money-holder with the value function
V 0
m.T h u s ,h e rn e tg a i ni sV 0
m − V 0















4) with the probability p1(x1 − M1xm1), she meets a type-1 agent, who likes her good
and issues a note in exchange. In the result of such a meeting, she produces, suﬀers a
production cost q0, and becomes a note-holder with the value function V 0
N.T h u s ,h e rn e t
gain is V 0
N − V 0











Finally, a type-0 seller may meet no buyer who wishes to buy her good; in this case, she
remains in the same state, hence the expected net gain of such a meeting is 0.24























































Similarly, we consider agents of other types and obtain 4 more Bellman￿s equations:
ρV
0

























1 − kqm1]+p1x∗(u(q1) − kq1);
ρV
1






m]} − p0NxNkqN + p1x∗(u(q1) − kq1).
By using (1.1), (1.3) and (1.5), we can simplify the Bellman￿s equations:
V
0
s =0 ; V
0
N = q0; V
0
m = qm0;( 1 . 2 5 )
ρq0 = p0(1 − M0 − N)x0[u(q0) − q0]+p1xN[u(qN) − q0]; (1.26)
ρqm0 = p0(1 − M0 − N)xm0[u(qm0) − qm0]+p1(1 − M1)xm[u(qm1) − qm0];
(1.27)
ρV






= p0(1 − M0 − N){−xm1u(q0)+( xm1 + x
+
m1)[u(qm0) − kqm1]}. (1.29)
By using (1.25), we can derive from (1.19) and (1.20) that Vs =0a n dVm = V 0
m = qm0,
and rewrite non-defection conditions (1.14)￿(1.18) as follows:
V
1 ≥ kqN;( 1 . 3 0 )
V
1 ≥ kqN + qm0 − kqm1;( 1 . 3 1 )25
kq1 =m i n {kq
∗,V
1,V
1 + kqm1 − qm0};( 1 . 3 2 )
if x1 <x ∗,t h e n
V
1 ≥ u(q0),V
1 ≥ u(q0)+qm0 − kqm1;( 1 . 3 3 )
if x1 >x ∗,t h e n
V
1 ≥ 0,V
1 ≥ qm0 − kqm1. (1.34)
1.8. Fit the Eighth (Types of stationary equilibria and the Vanishing of the
Rouble). It is natural to classify these equilibria according to the following criteria:
a) Types of exchange, which take place, the list of possible ones being
￿ monetary exchange inside 0-sector;
￿ monetary exchange between the two sectors;
￿ note exchange inside 0-sector;
￿ note exchange between the two sectors.
It is possible to show that it is optimal for type-1 agents to sustain a non-zero level of
inside exchange (multilateral trade credit), therefore we consider only cases when q1 > 0.
b) Which probability of note-issuing is used by 1-sector:
￿ below the individually optimal level;
￿ equal to the individually optimal level;
￿ above the individually optimal level.
The list of possible combinations of patterns of exchange and note-issuing rules is huge
but we can make it much shorter if we rule out cases when there are no trades between
sectors and the economy consists of two separate economies, each comprising agents of
one type, and the case without note exchange between the two sectors. Such a pattern of
exchange is possible if either there remain no notes in circulation at all and the economy
is pure monetary or some notes remain in circulation in 0-sector and play the role of
additional ￿at money for 0-sector.
In terms of parameters of the model, these restrictions imply:
N + M0 < 1,N > 0( 1 . 3 5 )
(if these conditions fail, all type-0 agents have either notes or money and do not trade at
all, or there is no notes in circulation);
x1 + xm1 + x
+
m1 > 0( 1 . 3 6 )
(if this condition fails, all type-1 agents pay with neither notes (if x1 =0 )n o rm o n e y
(xm1 = x
+
m1 = 0), and hence, there is no exchange between sectors);
xN + xm > 0( 1 . 3 7 )
(if this condition fails, all type-0 agents pay to type-1 agents with neither notes (xN =0 )
nor money (xm = 0), and hence, there is no exchange between sectors).
Since we assume that there is note exchange between the two sectors, we must have
x1 > 0o rxN > 0. The stationarity assumption and a balance equation (1.23) imply
x1 > 0 ⇐⇒ xN > 0, (1.38)26
therefore we may impose either of conditions in (1.38), and then (1.36)￿(1.37) are satis￿ed.
Finally, we assume that notes and money are not given away as gifts (at least, by
someone) so that
q0 + qN > 0,q m0 + qm1 > 0. (1.39)
Now, we divide equilibria satisfying additional conditions (1.35)￿(1.39) into two groups:
￿ type IM-equilibria (without monetary exchange between sectors);
￿ type IIM-equilibria (with monetary exchange between sectors).
In Sections 2 and 3, we study type-IM and type-IIM equilibria, respectively. An economy
with only notes in circulation is studied in Boyarchenko and Levendorski￿ i (1999), and
an economy without notes in circulation and collusion among agents ￿ in Boyarchenko
(1999). Notice that if there is no optimal x1 > 0 for type-1 agents, and their welfare grows
as x1 → 0, then we may say that the optimal note-issuing threshold is 0, and we obtain
a pure monetary economy with two groups of agents. We were able neither to prove that
this possibility never realizes nor ￿nd an example of such equilibria.
For small h, there are no such equilibria, since for such h,t y p e - IIM equilibria are
inferior from the point of view of 1-sector. Thus, the Rouble vanishes from the majority
of transactions, and here is an appropriare almost-quotation from The Hunting of the
Snark by Lewis Carrol:
￿It￿s a Stabilization!￿ was the sound that ￿rst came to our ears,4
And seemed almost too good to be true.
...................
In the midst of the word they were t r y i n gt os a y ,
In the midst of their laughter and glee,
Rouble had softly and suddenly vanished away ￿
For an equilibrium was wrong5,y o us e e .
4The reader remembers Chernomyrdin, Chubais and Lifschitz going places and telling fairy tales about
successes of the ￿nancial stabilization
5As usual, the Snark was a Boojum27
2. Stationary equilibria of type IM: The case of no monetary trades
between the two sectors
2.1. Equilibria speci￿cation. Suppose, a (non-degenerate) equilibrium without mone-
tary trades between the two sectors exist. Then, instead of M, a fraction M0 ∈ (0,1) of
type-0 agents with money plays the part of an exogenous parameter, and balance equa-
tions (1.22) and (1.24) become redundant. Further, in (1.23), we must set M1xm1 =0 ,










Since we assume that there is trade between sectors, with notes as mean of exchange, it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a tx1 > 0, and (1.38) gives xN > 0, hence xN = x∗,a n df r o m( 1 . 7 ) ,
we obtain
u(qN) ≥ q0. (2.2)
By using (1.39), (2.2), (1.2) and (1.26), we obtain
qN > 0,q 0 > 0. (2.3)
Further, the absence of monetary trade between sectors is possible in one of the following
cases:
1. In an equilibrium, prices are such that it is not optimal for type-0 agents to spend
money when trading with type-1 agents, and for type-1 agents￿to pay with money at all.
By (1.6) and (1.8)￿(1.10), these assumptions imply




m1 =0 ,u (qm0) <k q m1. (2.5)
¿From xm1 = x
+
m1 = 0 and (1.29), it follows that qm1 = 0, which contradicts the inequality
in (2.5), since u(qm0) ≥ 0. Thus, an equilibrium with properties (2.4)￿(2.5) does not exist.
2. Equilibrium prices are such that it is not optimal for type-1 agents to spend money
(hence, (2.5) holds), though money-holders of type-0 are willing to trade with type-1
agents. By (1.6), this implies xm = x∗,u (qm1) ≥ qm0.¿ F r o mxm1 = x
+
m1 = 0 and (1.29),
it follows that qm1 =0 ,h e n c eu(qm1) ≥ qm0 gives qm0 = 0, which contradicts an inequality
in (2.5).
3. Equilibrium prices are such that it is not optimal for type-0 agents to spend money
when trading with type-1 agents but type-1 agents are willing to spend money in some
cases provided they have it. In a steady state, this pattern of exchange leads to all the
money accumulated in 0-sector: M1 =0 ,M0p0 = M. Since we rule out the autarky28
for 0-sector, this case can be taken into consideration only if M<p 0 and hence, M0 =
M/p0 < 1. Also, by (1.6) and (1.8)￿(1.10), we must have that (2.1)￿(2.4) hold, and
xm1 + x
+
m1 > 0,u (qm0) ≥ qm1. (2.6)
In the sequel, we consider the case 3, with M0 ∈ (0,1) ￿xed. Notice that we must assume
that
qm1 <q m0;( 2 . 7 )
if qm1 ≥ qm0, there is no reason why type-0 money holders should not accept qm1 units of
good from type-1 agents if they accept qm0 ≤ qm1 from type-0 sellers.
Set h = ρ/x∗, B(γ)=p0(1 − M0)/(1 +γ), κm =( xm1 +x
+
m1)/x∗, γm1 = xm1/x∗.U s i n g








(u(qm0) − qm0); (2.9)
hV
1 = B(γ)[min{1,γ}u(q0) − γkqN]+p1(u(q1) − kq1); (2.10)
hkqm1 = B(γ){κm(u(qm0) − kqm1) − γm1u(q0)}. (2.11)
Since M1 = 0, the ￿social planner￿ of 1-sector maximizes V 1. In order that the note
issuing for 1-sector make sense, we need a participation constraint
min{1,γ}u(q0) − γkqN ≥ 0. (2.12)
2.2. Some simpli￿cation and additional characterization of type-IM equilibria.
In Appendix, we prove that it is optimal for type-0 agents to use both media of exchange
among themselves, and gains from monetary trade are positive:
xm0 = x∗,u (qm0) >q m0;( 2 . 1 3 )
x0 = x∗,u (q0) ≥ q0. (2.14)















qm0 − u(qm0)=0 . (2.16)










The RHS in (2.15) is non-negative, since u(qN) ≥ q0, and in (2.16), it is 0, whereas the
LHS￿s have the same structure, therefore applying Lemma 4.3 in Appendix to (2.15) and
(2.16), we see that
qm0 ≤ q0, and qm0 = q0 ⇐⇒ u(qN)=q0. (2.18)
Suppose, that γm1 > 0, which means that type-1 money holders would prefer to pay with
the money, if they had it, even when they are permitted to issue notes. Then (1.8) and
(2.18) imply
qm0 ≥ q0, and qm0 = q0 ⇐⇒ kqm1 =0 . (2.19)
By comparing (2.18) and (2.19), we conclude that if γm1 > 0, then u(qN)=q0 = qm0,
and kqm1 = 0, and then (2.17) gives γm1/κm = 1. From the de￿nitions of xm1 and x
+
m1,i t
follows that if γm1 > 0, then κm = 1, therefore γm1 =1 ,t o o .
To sum up: either
γ =1 ,x m1 = x∗,q m1 =0 ,u (qN)=q0 = qm0, (2.20)






q = u(q), (2.21)
or
γ ∈ (0,1),x m1 =0 , κm =1− γ. (2.22)
In Subsection 2.4, we show that if the trading friction, h, is small, then a choice (2.22)
is non-optimal, and hence, an equilibrium is determined by (2.20)￿(2.21) (or it does not
exist at all).
It seems to be impossible to obtain analytical results for arbitrary h, since equilibria
under consideration are solutions to a very complicated non-linear system in more than
a dozen unknowns.
2.3. T h ec a s eo fs m a l lh and ineﬀective type-1 agents. If the economy is very active
and the number of single coincidence meetings per unit of time is large, the trading friction,
h, is small. This means that agents can be patient and wait for a better production
opportunity to arrive. A type-0 buyer with a note will not be willing to trade with type-1
sellers, unless type-1 agents redeem for a note a suﬃciently high amount qN.T h i sqN may
be too high a production level for type-1 agents, since they suﬀer higher production cost
than type-0 agents, so that it would be optimal for them not to trade at all.
In this case, it remains for type-0 agents to trade among themselves only. The economy
splits into two disjoint sectors, a case which we do not consider.
Theorem 2.1. For k>1 ￿xed, there exists h0 > 0 such that if h ∈ (0,h 0) then type-IM
equilibria do not exist.
For proof, see Appendix.
Remark 2.1. In Boyarchenko and Levendorski￿ i 1999, we have shown for a non-monetary
economy with inside money, that if k>1i s￿xed and h and x∗ are small and satisfy
h> >x ∗ (i.e. agents are very picky), then there exists a non-degenerate equilibrium with
properties: u(qN)=q0,a n dγ → +∞,q 0 → 0a sh → 0. In this paper, if we disregard30
monetary constraints, a subsystem in (γ,q 0,q N) has a solution with the same properties,
but as we already saw, the very presence of money forces γ ≤ 1, under assumption that
there are no money ￿ows between the two sectors. Thus, a possible type-IM equilibrium
with large γ must turn into a type-IIM equilibrium, which we will study in the next
section.
Suppose, the economy is in a type-IM steady state, and type-1 agents are less eﬀective
than type-0 ones. Theorem 2.1 and the corresponding result for type-IIM equilibria mean
that if agents are not very picky, and the trading friction vanishes (due to the investment
in infrastructure, say) but the ineﬀectiveness of type-1 agents remains the same, the
economy loses stability. Thus,
if a policy maker willing to improve an economy invests in the trading infrastructure
at the expense of the production sector, the economy loses stability and splits into two
disjoint economies.
In Subsection 2.5, we will show that the stability will be lost even if the ineﬀectiveness
of type-1 agents vanishes with the trading friction but slower.
2.4. T h ec a s eo fs m a l lh and eﬀective type-1 agents. If k = 1, i.e. type-1 agents
are as eﬀective as type-0 agents, a problem described in the previous Subsection does not
arise and an equilibrium with interacting sectors exists for arbitrary small h>0. This
result and the next one, for type-1 agents with small ineﬀectiveness k − 1, are similar
to results for a non-monetary economy with inside money studied in Boyarchenko and
Levendorski￿ i 1999.
Theorem 2.2. Let k =1 .
Then there exists h0 > 0 such that for h ∈ (0,h 0)
a) an equilibrium exists, and it is unique;
b) an equilibrium amount of good produced by type-0 agents for a note, q0,c a nb ef o u n d




[u(q) − q], (2.23)
and they produce the same amount qm0 = q0 for a unit of money;
c) an optimal choice of a note-issuing rule for 1-sector is x1 = x∗ (i.e. an individually
optimal threshold), an equilibrium amount of notes in circulation is equal to p0(1−M0)/2,
and qN, an optimal amount of good redeemed for a note, is determined from
u(qN)=q0;( 2 . 2 4 )
d) let q∗ denote a unique positive solution to
u(q)=q;( 2 . 2 5 )
then
q
∗ <q N <q 0 = qm0 <q ∗;( 2 . 2 6 )
e) as h → +0, qN and q0 = qm0 converge to q∗;
f) qm1 =0 ,i . e .1-sector would have produced nothing for a unit of money, if oﬀered
one.31
For proof, see Appendix.
We see that
￿ type-1 agents exercise their monopoly power and redeem for a note less than type-
0 agents produce for the same note to each other and to type-1 agents, and for a
unit of money to each other;
￿ as the trading friction vanishes (h → 0), so does the monopoly power (we measure
it by 1 − q0/qN);
￿ as the trading frictions vanishes (h → 0), so do trading surpluses in trades of all
types.
The next theorem shows that even when the trading friction is small, 1-sector may be
ineﬀective but the ineﬀectiveness of type-1 agents (i.e. k −1) must be small. It also gives
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an admissible level of ineﬀectiveness.
Theorem 2.3. Let q0 be a unique positive solution to (2.23).
Then there exists h0 > 0 such that for h ∈ (0,h 0],at y p e - IM equilibrium exists if and
only if
(1 ≤)k ≤ u(q0)/u
−1(q0). (2.27)
The equilibrium is unique, and in this equilibrium,
q0 and qN are determined from (2.23) and (2.24), respectively,
γ =1 ,
qm0 = q0,
an equilibrium amount of notes in circulation is equal to p0(1 − M0)/2,
(2.26) hold, and
as h → +0, qN and q0 = qm0 converge to q∗.
For proof, see Appendix.
Notice that u(q0)/u−1(q0) > 1, hence equilibria described in Theorem 2.3 and satisfying
k>1d oe x i s t .
If k>1 but satis￿es (2.27) then remarks made after Theorem 2.2 remain valid. In
addition, if the trading friction and the ineﬀectiveness of 1-sector are small then the
equilibrium quantities q0 and qN, and the welfare of a type-0 agent V =( 1+M0)q0/2a r e
independent of the level of ineﬀectiveness, k − 1, but the cost kqN,w h i c hat y p e - 1a g e n t
suﬀers while redeeming a note, increases, and the value function of a type-1 agent, V 1,

















where k1 =( k − 1)/h.6
When the trading friction and the ineﬀectiveness of type-1 agents are small, only type-1
agents have to bear the cost of their ineﬀectiveness, their monopoly power notwithstanding,
6O(h) is the standard notation for any function f(h), which decays as fast as h,a sh → 0: |f(h)| ≤ Ch,
where C is independent of h (and on other parameters f may depend on).32
whereas all the characteristics of the economy observable by type-0 agents (namely, prices)
are independent of the level of ineﬀectiveness.
2.5. Instability Index and Instability Threshold. By Theorem 2.3, q0 → q∗ as h →
+0, therefore from (2.27), we deduce
Theorem 2.4. a) Let




Then there exists h0 > 0 such that if h ∈ (0,h 0] and k ≤ 1+k1h,t h e nat y p e - IM
equilibrium exist.
b) Let




Then there exists h0 > 0 such that if h ∈ (0,h 0] and k ≥ 1+k1h,t h e nat y p e - IM
equilibrium does not exist.
Notice that an expression in the LHS in (2.29) and (2.30) is equal to a product of the
level of the ineﬀectiveness, k−1, the inverse trading friction, h−1,a n d1−M0, the defect of
the money supply. We call this product the instability index. When the instability index
crosses certain threshold, namely, the RHS in (2.29) and (2.30), a type-IM equilibrium
loses stability.
An economy with ineﬀective 1-sector can preserve stability if the money supply and/or
trading friction increase.
2.6. Dependence on Money Supply. Suppose that the government gives an additional
amount of money to some type-0 sellers. Then some of type-0 sellers become buyers,
fractions p0 and p1 of agents of type-0 and type-1 do not change, but the fraction M
of agents carrying money and the fraction M0 = M/p0 of type-0 agents carrying money
increase. After some transition period, the economy arrives into the new steady state. If
the increase of the money supply is not very large, the type of an equilibrium remains the
same, and in the new steady state
1. the amount of notes p0(1 − M0)/2 in circulation decreases but the total amount of
liquidity p0M0 +p0(1−M0)/2=p0(1+M0)/2 increases: additional money squeeze out a
part of notes but slowly: 2 units of money are needed to replace 1 note;
2. the instability index k1(1 − M0) decreases, hence the economy moves away from a
line where it can lose stability and split into two disjoint economies;
3. the weighted average of value functions of type-0 agents















increases, provided M is not large (an optimal amount M from the point of view of





where q0(M0) is a unique positive solution to (2.23));
4. eﬀective type-1 agents prefer to have no money in economy at all:
Theorem 2.5. If the trading friction is small, and type-1 agents are eﬀective: k =1 ,
then their welfare decreases with M growing.
(proof in Appendix), and hence, the same is true if their ineﬀectiveness k − 1 is positive
but small. In general, for a given k>1, there exist a minimal positive level M∗ = M∗(k)
such that if M<M ∗(k), the economy splits (M∗ can be found from (2.27)), and an
optimal level M∗∗(k) ≥ M∗(k), which maximizes the welfare of 1-sector. If k is not large,
an optimal money supply from the point of view of 1-sector is smaller than an optimal
money supply from the point of view of 0-sector, but for large k, it is the other way round.34
3. Stationary equilibria of type IIM: The case of trades of all types
3.1. Main Results. Due to more complex pattern of exchange, it is more diﬃcult to
obtain analytical results, and constructions become long. So, we prefer to describe the
main results ￿rst, next discuss some numerical examples, and only after that give explicit
formulations and proofs.
We consider the case of not very picky agents and not very large money supply; the
trading friction is assumed to be small, and here are the main results:
1. When the trading friction is small, in a ￿good￿7 type-IIM monetary equilibrium,
1-sector issues notes below the individually optimal level, and a type-1 money holder pays
with a note whenever allowed to. In other words, for a type-1 agent, it is individually
optimal to pay with notes always, but the ￿social planner￿ of 1-sector restricts note-issuing
in order to maximize the welfare of the sector.
2. In a type-IIM equilibrium, a 1-sector accumulates more money per capita than
0-sector.
3. If the trading friction vanishes faster than the ineﬀectiveness of 1-sector, any economy
with trade between sectors loses stability and splits.
4. Type-IIM equilibria are more fragile than type-IM equilibria.
5. If the trading friction is very small, monetary trade between sectors may exist only
if type-1 agents need an in￿ow of money for some exogenous (from the point of view of
our model) purposes, for instance, to pay taxes; otherwise, it is optimal for them not to
use money at all.
Of course, to include taxation, our model should be modi￿ed but its structure will
remain essentially the same.
6. In the preceding Section, we have reduced the initial problem to a relatively simple
equation (which admits an explicit solution in the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion, so that it is possible to obtain analytic expressions for all endogenous variables);
here we manage to reduce the initial problem to a maximization of a rather complicated
function on an interval (0,1), subject to a non-strict inequality. From the computational
point of view, to solve such a problem and calculate equilibrium values of endogeneous
variables is easy, and the corresponding procedures are robust and do not require much
time of a PC, but an analytical solution is impossible even for simplest utility functions.
3.2. Numerical Examples. We consider the Cobb-Douglas utility u(q)=dqβ,w h e r e
d>0a n dβ ∈ (0,1).
In the ￿rst example, we ￿x h and p1, and vary the ineﬀectiveness level and the money
supply. In Fig.3.1, we plot the gain of 1-sector from trade with 0-sector. A plane in the
left corner (zero gain) indicates a region where the economy splits into two disjoint ones.
In the right corner, there is a region where a type-IIM equilibrium becomes superior from
the point of view of 1-sector. The region is more clearly seen on Fig.3.2, where we plot
the weighted value function of type-0 agents. A type-IIM equilibrium becomes optimal
for type-0 agents only where the money supply is not small, and the ineﬀectiveness of
7If agents are very picky, i.e. they are too specialized in consumption, there may exist ￿bad￿ equilibria
when too many notes circulate and the production level is too low35
agents is small; with M increasing, an admissible level of ineﬀectiveness increases as well.
It is interesting to note that for moderate levels of money supply, the change of the type
of an equilibrium from IM to IIM yields a sharp decline of the welfare for 0-sector, and
only for fairly large values of M,at y p e - IIM equilibrium becomes superior to a type-IM
equilibrium from the point of view of type-0 agents. However, the next picture (Fig.3.3)
shows that
for large values of M, it is optimal for type-0 agents to severe all contacts with 1-sector,
and if they happen to continue to trade with 1-sector, it is due to their inability to collude
and change the type of the equilibrium. If they could, an increase of the money supply
would have made the economy to split; type-1 agents would have become worse oﬀ,b u t
type-0 agents ￿ better oﬀ.
In Fig.3.2, it is also clearly seen that
the same change of the money supply, at the same existing level, can lead to opposite
eﬀects: at small levels of ineﬀectiveness, an increase of M may cause the welfare of type-0
agents to drop, but at larger values ￿ to jump.
Roughly speaking,
an increase of the money supply is good for type-0 agents, if the money supply is not
already large, and type-1 agents are rather ineﬀective; otherwise, a decrease of the money
supply may be better.
As far as ineﬀective agents are concerned, Fig.3.1 shows that
if the ineﬀectiveness is not large, the note-issuing sector can preserve its note-issuing
role and hence remain alive8 even for low levels of money supply, but the larger the in-
eﬀectiveness, the higher level of money supply is needed to activate the ineﬀective sector
and make it alive and well. This activation is welfare-improving for the eﬀective sector,
too.
This consideration can be reversed, of course:
if 1-sector is very ineﬀective, then even moderate decrease of money supply can make
it eﬀectively die, and a disappearance of an additional source of liquidity and some of
trading partners from an economy causes the welfare of eﬀective agents to drop.
In Fig. 3.4￿3.7, we plot amounts of good produced (or redeemed) by diﬀerent agents for
a unit of money or a note. We see that apart of jumps, where the type of an equilibrium
changes, an increase of money supply causes the quantities to decrease.
Very similar pictures obtain when we ￿x M and allow p1, the size of 1-sector, to change,
and the same is true if we take M = p1M∗,w h e r eM∗ is ￿xed. The lines of transition
from one type of equilibrium to another one, and the surfaces are of essentially the same
shape (only the locations change a little). We do not show the pictures here in order to
save the space, but make some comments.
The ￿rst general remark is:
p1, the size of 1-sector, and M, the money supply, play essentially the same stabilizing
role for 1-sector, so all conclusions made above remain valid if we replace M by M + p1.
8In the sense: continue to trade with 0-sector; if we introduce the taxation into our model, an isolated
sector will be unable to earn money to pay taxes and its agents will become bankrupt36
In particular, there is ￿the strength in numbers eﬀect￿ for the ineﬀective sector: when
the sector is suﬃciently large, it will survive at any level of the money supply.
The second remark concerns a more general version of our model, with agents of varying
level of ineﬀectiveness:
there is a multiplicative eﬀect of an increase of money supply: ￿rst, it allows for some
of ineﬀective agents to get activated, and the resulting increase of the size of an alive part
of 1-sector activates some of even less eﬀective agents, and so on ￿ till the point, where
there is an essential diﬀerence in the eﬀectiveness of ￿alive￿ and ￿dead￿ agents. This
￿snow-balling eﬀect￿ can push an economy into the region, where the welfare of eﬀective
type-0 agents is much lower than that in an initial state with a bit lower level of money
supply.
Once again, this consideration can be reversed:
if, for a given level of money supply and size of an alive part of 1-sector, the ineﬀec-
tiveness of the latter is close to a critical point, then a small decrease of money supply
can lead to a rapid contraction of 1-sector.
We may say that the ineﬀective sector behaves like a ￿black hole￿:as m a l lo n eq u i c k l y
evaporates, and a large one is getting larger and larger.
In the next example, we ￿x p1 =0 .3, and M =0 .2, and vary h and k1. For small values
of h, a transition line, which separates type-0M and type-IM equilibria, is clearly seen. A
type-IIM equilibrium becomes optimal only when h is not very small, and the ineﬀective-
ness is small; the larger the h, the larger values of ineﬀectivness become admissible.
In agreement with analytical results, we see that when h vanishes, qm0 in pure monetary
equilibria and q0,q N,q m0 in type-IM equilibria stabilize (to q∗ =1 ,o fc o u r s e ) ,a n dg a i n s
from trade with 0-sector, for 1-sector, become a linear decreasing function in k1.
With h growing, value functions and amounts of good produced or redeemed decrease
(once again, not at transition lines, where they can jump or drop.)
To end the discussion of numerical examples, we note that if h is not very small, then all
conclusions made after the ￿rst example essentially remain valid if we replace M with h−1
or with d. In particular, a small change of the trading friction or consumption technology
can produce ￿snow-balling eﬀects￿ described above.
3.3. Speci￿cation of Type-IIM equilibria. Since we assume that there is trade be-
tween sectors, with notes as a medium of exchange, it must be the case that x1 > 0, and
(1.38) gives xN > 0, hence xN = x∗, and from (1.7), we obtain
xN = x∗, and u(qN) ≥ q0. (3.1)
By using (1.39), (3.1), (1.2) and (1.26), we deduce
qN > 0,q 0 > 0. (3.2)
Further, since we consider equilibria with money ￿ows between sectors, it is necessary
that xm > 0a n dxm1 + x
+
m1 > 0; then on the strength of (1.6),
xm = x∗, and u(qm1) ≥ qm0, (3.3)37
and from (1.8) and (1.10),
u(qm0) ≥ kqm1. (3.4)
We assume that k ∈ [1,C 0], where C0 > 1 is independent of other parameters; then (3.3)
and (3.4) and properties of u imply that qm1 and qm0 are bounded and bounded away
from 0: there exist C,c > 0 such that for any h and k ∈ [1,C 0],
c ≤ qm0 ≤ C, c ≤ qm1 ≤ C. (3.5)
Lemma 3.1.
xm0 = x∗, and u(qm0) ≥ qm0. (3.6)
Proof. By (1.4), the statements in (3.6) are equivalent. Suppose, that u(qm0) <q m0.
Then from (3.4), qm0 >k q m1, and from (3.3), u(qm1) >u (qm0), which is equivalent to
qm1 >q m0.B u tk ≥ 1a n dqm1 > 0, which leads to a contradiction. ⁄
To simplify the study of type-IIM equilibria, we make two assumptions:
h/x∗ ≤ †, (3.7)
where †>0i ss u ﬃciently small, i.e. agents are not very picky, and
M<p 1, (3.8)
which means that a fraction of type-1 money holders is bounded away from 1: from (3.3)
and (1.22),
M1 ≤ M/p1 < 1. (3.9)
As we will show, these two conditions exclude ￿bad￿ equilibria with x1 ∼ 1, when too
many notes are being issued and equilibrium quantities are small (in Theorem 2.2 in
Boyarchenko and Levendorski￿ i 1999, we constructed such equilibria for an economy with
only notes in circulation, and if h/x∗ >> 1, it is possible to construct type-IIM equilibria
with similar properties.)
By using (3.4) and (1.24), we obtain
M0 → 0 ⇐⇒ 1 − M0 − N → 0 ⇐⇒ N → 1, (3.10)
and from (1.23), (3.4) and (3.5), it follows that
1 − M0 − N → 0 ⇐⇒ γ → +∞,
where γ = x1/x∗;t ob em o r ep r e c i s e ,t h e r ee x i s tC,c > 0s u c ht h a t
c/γ ≤ 1 − N − M0 ≤ C/γ. (3.11)
Lemma 3.2. There exists †0 > 0 such that if † ∈ (0,† 0],t h e ni na n yt y p e - IIM equilibrium,
x0 = x∗, and u(q0) ≥ q0. (3.12)
Proof in Appendix.
Lemma 3.3. There exists †0 > 0 such that if (3.7) holds with † ∈ (0,† 0],t h e ni na n y
type-IIM equilibrium, γ ∈ (0,1),a n dxm1 =0 .
Proof in Appendix.38
3.4. A ￿good￿ type-IIM equilibrium. Fix γ ∈ (0,1), divide (1.23) and (1.24) by x∗,
using xN = xm = x∗, x1/x∗ = γ and (xm1 + x
+
m1)/x∗ =1− γ:
(1 − N − M0)γ = N,
M0(1 − M1)=( 1− M0 − N)M1(1 − γ).
By using (1.22) and these two equalities, we ￿nd








where M0 = M0(γ) is a positive solution to an equation
2γp0M
2
0 + M0(1 + γ(p1 − p0 − 2M)) + M(γ − 1) = 0. (3.15)
Lemma 3.4. a) For any γ ∈ (0,1), a positive root of an equation (3.15) exists, is unique,
and satis￿es M0 ∈ (0,M).
b) If γ =0 ,( 3 . 15) has one root M0 = M.
c) M0 = M0(γ) is continuous on [0,1).
Proof. a) Since 2γp0 > 0a n dM(γ − 1) < 0, one of solutions is positive, and the other ￿
negative, and to prove that M0 <M,i ts u ﬃces to check that with M0 = M,t h eL H Si s
positive. But this is straightforward.
b) Evident.
c) The continuity on (0,1) follows from the Implicit Function Theorem. To prove the
continuity at γ = 0, we note that from (3.15), M0(γ) → M as γ → 0. ⁄
Now from (1.21) and (3.13) it follows that M1 >M, i.e. in a ￿good￿ type-IIM equilibrium,
1-sector accumulates more money per capita than 0-sector.
For γ ∈ [0,1), set B(γ)=p0(1 − M0(γ))/(1 + γ), and notice that since M0 ≤ M<1,
B(γ) is bounded away from 0 uniformly in h. Having in mind that M0 and M1 are
uniquely de￿ned by a choice of γ, and using (3.14), we rewrite (1.26)￿(1.29) as follows
hq0 = B(γ)(u(q0) − q0)+p1(u(qN) − q0); (3.16)
hqm0 = B(γ)(u(qm0) − qm0)+p1(1 − M1(γ))(u(qm1) − qm0); (3.17)
hV
1 = B(γ)γ(u(q0) − kqN)+p1(u(q1) − kq1); (3.18)
hkqm1 = B(γ)(1 − γ)(u(qm0) − kqm1). (3.19)
Lemma 3.5. There exists h0 > 0 such that for any h ∈ (0,h 0], in a ￿good￿ type-IIM
equilibrium,
a) q1 = q∗;
b) incentive compatibility constraints (1.30)￿(1.34) are satis￿ed;




Now, for a given γ ∈ [0,1), we can de￿ne step be step:
M0 = M0(γ) from (3.15);
M1 = M1(γ) from (3.13);
q0 = q0(γ)f r o m
hq0 = B(γ)(u(q0) − q0)( 3 . 2 1 )
(due to properties of u, a positive solution to (3.21) exists, and it is unique);
qN(γ)=u−1(q0(γ));









by substituting (3.22) into (3.17), we obtain an equation
hqm0 = B(γ)(u(qm0) − qm0)+p1(1 − M1(γ))(u(qm1(γ,q m0)) − qm0).
(3.23)
For γ ￿xed, (3.23) can be written in the form
Aq = v(q),
where A is a positive constant, and v satis￿e st h es a m ec o n d i t i o n sa su,n a m e l y ,v is in-
creasing, concave and satis￿es the Inada conditions (the veri￿cation of all these properties
is straightforward). Hence, (3.23) has a (unique) positive solution qm0 = qm0(γ), and after
that, (3.22) de￿nes qm1 as a function of γ.
We see that 1-sector maximizes a function
Φ(γ)=h
−1B(γ)γ(u(q0) − kqN)+M1(γ)kqm1(γ),
on (0,1), subject to (3.3), (3.4) and (3.6); inequalities (1.35), (1.36), (1.39), (3.1), (3.2)
and (3.12) are satis￿ed by construction. Since qm0 > 0, (3.22) gives qm1 > 0, and (3.19)
implies (3.4). Thus, (3.4) is redundant. Further, let (3.6) be violated: u(qm0) <q m0.
Then (3.22) gives qm1 <q m0, and since u is increasing, u(qm1) <u (qm0) <q m0, i.e. (3.3)
is violated, too. Thus, a pair of constraints (3.3), (3.6) is equivalent to one constraint
(3.3). Hence, the only remaining constraint is (3.3).
On the strength of (3.5) and (3.19), γ is bounded away from 1: γ ≤ c,w h e r ec<1( i n
the next subsection, we will show that γ is bounded away from 1 uniformly in h,M,p0,k:
there exists c ∈ (0,1) such that γ ≤ c, for all h ∈ (0,1],M <1,p 0 ∈ (0,1), and k ≥ 1,
in any type-IIM equilibrium). Hence, we may assume that 1-sector maximizes Φ on a set
J \ 0, where
J = {γ ∈ [0,c] | u(qm1(γ)) ≥ qm0(γ)}.
In order that the trade with 0-sector make sense, it is necessary that Φ(γ), the gain from
trade of a type-1 agent with 0-sector, be non-negative. In the next subsection, we will
show that if M>0a n dJ is non-empty, then Φ is positive on J, hence there is no need
to introduce an additional constraint.40
Theorem 3.6. For any M1 < 1, there exist C>0 and h0 > 0 such that if h ∈ (0,h 0]
and x∗ ≥ Ch,t h e n
a) a type-IIM equilibrium exists if and only if J 6= ∅,a n dt h em a x i m u mo fΦ on J is
attained at a point γ > 0;
b) if conditions in a) are satis￿ed, then an optimal γ maximizes W on J,a n do p t i m a l
q0,q N,e t c .a r ed e ￿ned by this γ as described above;
c) if conditions in a) are satis￿ed, then q0 = q∗ +O(h),a sh → 0,a n dt h es a m ei st r u e
for qN, qm0,a n dqm1.
Proof. a) J i sas u b s e to fac o m p a c t[ 0 ,c], which is de￿ned by non-strict inequalities for
continuous functions, hence J is compact. By continuity of M0 = M0(γ)a n du,a n d
applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (3.21) and (3.23), we see that q0,q N,q m0,q m1
are continuous, hence Φ is continuous, and the maximum of Φ on J exists if and only if
J is non-empty. If the maximum is achieved at some γ > 0, it is an optimal choice for
1-sector, and if the maximum is attained only at 0, then an optimization problem on J \0
has no solution.
b )i se v i d e n t ,a n dc )w i l lb ep r o v e di nA p p e n d i x . ⁄
Remark 3.1. For some parameters￿ values, J is empty. For instance, the following
￿nonexistence-of-type-IIM-equilibria￿ theorem holds:
Theorem 3.7. Let M<p 1.T h e r e e x i s t C>0 and h0 > 0 such that if h ∈ (0,h 0],
x∗ ≥ Ch,a n dk ≥ 1+Ch,t h e nat y p e - IIM equilibrium does not exist.
Proof in Appendix.
Corollary 3.8. Let M<p 1. There exist C>0 and h0 > 0 such that if h ∈ (0,h 0],
x∗ ≥ Ch,a n dk ≥ 1+Ch, then no non-degenerate equilibria exist.
Proof. In Section 2, we have shown that under these conditions, a type-IM equilibrium
does not exist as well, and in Boyarchenko and Levendorski￿ i (1999) and Boyarchenko
(1999) the same has been shown for economies without money and notes, respectively. ⁄
Thus,
If the trading friction vanishes faster than the ineﬀectiveness of 1-sector, then any
economy with an ineﬀective 1-sector loses stability and splits into disjoint parts.
3.5. Some asymptotic analysis. Here we derive asymptotic formulas for equilibrium
quantities as h → 0, which allow us to ￿nd approximate conditions of existence of equi-
libria, approximate formulas for value functions, and compare type-IIM and type-IM
equilibria.
By Theorem 3.7, we may assume that k =1+k1h,w h e r ek1 = O(1) as h → 0;
for simplicity, we assume that k1 is a non-negative constant, and in the end, formulate
existence (nonexistence) conditions in terms of k1.
























+ M) − Ch,
and hence, for small h, Φ is positive on J.
c) A set










is an approximation to J in the sense that the left (resp., right) ends of J and J0 are at
ad i s t a n c eo fo r d e rO(h),a sh → +0.
By using Φ0 as an approximation to Φ,a n dJ0 as an approximation to J, we can simplify
the study of type-IIM equilibria.







is increasing on [0,1), (3.26)
then J0\0 6= ∅ if and only if F is less than or equal to Q =( u0(q∗)+1)/u0(q∗), in some right
neighborhood of 0. Now the following speci￿cation of Theorem 3.6 is straightforward.
Theorem 3.10. a) Let (3.26) hold, and




Then there exists h0 > 0 such that if h ∈ (0,h 0] and k ≤ 1+k1h,t h e nat y p e - IIM
equilibrium exist.
b) Let (3.26) hold, and




Then there exists h0 > 0 such that if h ∈ (0,h 0] and k ≥ 1+k1h,t h e nat y p e - IIM
equilibrium does not exist.
Notice that an expression in the LHS in (3.27) and (3.28) is equal to a product of the
level of the ineﬀectiveness, k − 1, the inverse trading friction, h−1,a n d1−M, the defect
of the money supply, i.e. it can be interpreted as the instability index similar to the one
introduced for type-IM equilibria in Subsection 2.8; then the RHS in (3.27) and (3.28) is
the instability threshold. We see that it is signi￿cantly lower than the instability threshold
for type-IM equilibria, 2(1+u0(q∗))/(u0(q∗)p0), hence type-IIM equilibria are more fragile
than type-IIM equilibria.42
3.6. Comparison of type-IIM and type-IM equilibria.
Theorem 3.11. There exists h0 > 0 such that if h ∈ (0,h 0] a n dat y p e - IIM equilibrium
exists, then a type-IM equilibrium exists as well, and the value function of type-1 agents
in the latter is larger than the one in the former.
Proof. It follows from (3.24)￿(3.25) and (2.30), that the diﬀerence of the value function
of type-1 agents in type-IM equilibrium and the one in type-IIM equilibrium is equal to
Ψ0 − Φ0(γ)+O(h), where Φ0(γ) is given by (3.25), γ is an optimal threshold, of which


























≥ k1B(γ)(1 − γ)+1 ,
and Ψ0 − Φ0(γ) ≥ q∗[k1(B(γ) − (p0 − M)/2) + 1 − M1(γ)]. But B(γ) − (p0 + M)/2=
p0(1−M0(γ))/(1+γ)−(p0−M)/2 is positive for γ ∈ (0,1), since p0 < 1a n dM0(γ) <M,
and 1 − M1(γ) is positive, since M1(γ) < 1. ⁄
The reason for a type-IIM equilibrium to be inferior is a participation constraint (3.3),
which must be satis￿ed if 1-sector is to get money from type-0 agents ever: to achieve
t h es a m el e v e lo fw e l f a r ea si nat y p e - IM equilibrium, 1-sector must issue notes in large
quantities, but then the relative value of holding money increases, type-0 agents start to
require of type-1 agents too much good in exchange for a unit of money (as compared
to an amount of good which type-1 agents get for a unit of money), so that it becomes
non-optimal for type-1 agents to sell their good for money on such unfavorable conditions.43
4. Appendix: Technical results for type-IM equilibria
4.1. Auxiliary results. To simplify our problem, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. Let c be a positive constant, and functions u,v : R+ → R+ satisfy
u is smooth, increasing and concave, and satis￿es the Inada conditions.
(4.1)
Then functions cu, u + v, u◦ v and q 7→ u(cq) also satisfy (4.1).
Proof. Direct veri￿cation. ⁄
Lemma 4.2. If u satis￿es (4.1), then for any c>0, there exists ﬂ q>0 such that
u(q) ≥ cq ⇐⇒ q ∈ [0, ﬂ q]. (4.2)
Proof. Evident. ⁄
Lemma 4.3. a) For any tuple (x0,x 1,q N) ∈ {0,x ∗}￿[0,1] ￿ (0,+∞), there exists a
unique q0 = q0(x0,x 1,q N) > 0 satisfying (2.8) and (1.2);
b) q0 is a smooth function in (x1,q N);
c) q0 is an increasing concave function in qN, satisfying ∂q0/∂qN → 0 as qN → +∞;
d) q0 → +∞ as qN → +∞, but slower than qN:
lim
qN→+∞max
x0,x1 q0(x0,x 1,q N)/qN =0 ;
e) if x0 > 0, then there exists †>0 such that
q0(x0,x 1,q N) ≥ †, ∀ (x1,q N) ∈ [0,1] ￿ (0,+∞);
f) if x0 > 0,t h e nq0 is decreasing in x1,o nas e tw h e r eu(q0) >q 0.
Proof. a) Write (2.8) as φ(q0)=u(qN), where
φ(q)=Aq − Bu(q),A =( h/p0 +1+B)k, B = p0(1 − M0)x0/((1 + γ)p1x∗) ≥ 0.
If x0 =0 ,t h e nq0 = u(qN)/A satis￿es (4.1) by Lemma 4.1. If x0 > 0, then B>0, and
φ0(q)=A − Bu0(q) < 0i nas u ﬃciently small right vicinity of 0, due to u0(+0) = +∞.
Hence, φ(q) < 0 in some right vicinity of 0. Since u decreases and u0(+∞)=0 ,φ0 has
the only root on (0,+∞), call it ￿ q, and it is a simple root. Clearly, φ(￿ q) < 0, φ(q) < 0
on (0, ￿ q), and φ increases on (￿ q,+∞). Moreover, φ(q) → +∞ as q → +∞,h e n c eq0,
a solution to (2.8), is unique and satis￿es q0(x1,q N) > ￿ q(x1), where ￿ q(x1) is the root of
φ(q)=0 .
b) follows from the Implicit Function Theorem.
c) On (￿ q,+∞), φ0(q)=A − Bu0(q) > 0, and φ￿(q)=−Bu￿(q) > 0. Hence, φ is
convex on (￿ q,+∞), and φ−1 :( 0 ,+∞) → (￿ q,+∞) is increasing and concave. Hence,
q0(q)=φ−1(u(q)) also is.
The second statement is evident since φ0(q) ∼ A for q large, and u0(qN) → 0a sqN →
+∞.
d) For large q and qN, φ(q)=q + o(q), u(qN)=o(qN), and d) follows.
e) Evidently, we can set † =m i n x1 ￿ q(x1); it is positive by the proof of part a).44
f) By calculating the derivative of an implicit function given by (2.8), we obtain for









It is negative on a set, where u(q0) >q 0,s i n c eA − Bu0(q0) > 0t h e r e . ⁄
Lemma 4.4. For all M0 < 1, x1 ∈ [0,1] and h>0, a positive solution to (2.9) exists. It
is unique and satis￿es
u(qm0) >q m0. (4.3)
If xm0 =0 , then (2.9) has a unique solution qm0 =0 .
Proof. If xm0 > 0, then qm0 > 0 exists and is unique since u satis￿es (4.1); (4.3) is
immediate from (2.9) for qm0 > 0.
If xm0 =0 ,t h e nqm0 = 0 is evident from (2.9). ⁄
Proof of (2.13). Since u(0) ≥ 0, (4.3) means that in all cases, u(qm0) ≥ qm0,a n dt h e n
(2.13) follows from (1.4).
Notice that if qm1 =0 ,t h e nqm0 > 0 by (1.39), and if qm1 > 0, then qm0 > 0 by (4.1).
Proof of (2.14). Suppose, x0 = 0, then by (1.2), u(q0) <q 0, and by comparing with
(2.2), q0 <q N. On the other hand, (2.12) imply kqN ≤ u(q0) <q 0.S i n c e k ≥ 1a n d
qN > 0, we have a contradiction, and x0 > 0. By (1.2), (2.14) holds.
Denote by Q a set of tuples {q0,q N,q m0,x 1,V1} satisfying all conditions in the de￿nition
of a type-IM equilibrium, except for the requirement of maximization of V 1.
Lemma 4.5. There exists C>0 such that for all h>0 and X ∈ Q,
q0 = q0(X) ≤ C, qN = qN(X) ≤ C, qm0 = qm0(X) ≤ C. (4.4)
Proof. Suppose, there exists a sequence (Xn)n≥1 ⊂ Q s.t. q0(Xn) → +∞. Then for n
large enough, Lemma 4.3 d) and (2.2) contradict each other. Hence, q0 ≤ C, therefore by
(2.12), qN ≤ C1.
Since u satis￿es (4.1), qm0 ≤ C follows from (2.9) and Lemma 4.2. ⁄
Lemma 4.6. There exists h0 > 0 such that for h ∈ (0,h 0],
a) the problem of maximization of V 1 is equivalent to the problem of maximization for





b) incentive compatibility constraints (1.30)￿(1.34) are redundant.
Proof. If 1-sector chooses q1 = q∗,w eh a v eu(q∗) − kq∗ > 0, and (2.10) gives V 1 ≥ ch−1,
where c>0 is independent of h>0. Now, for small h, (4.4) gives b) and proves that this
choice of q1 is really optimal. Since this q1 is independent of x1 and qN, a) follows. ⁄
Notice that this proof is valid for type-IIM equilibria, too.
Lemma 4.7. There exist C,h0 > 0 s.t. if h ∈ (0,h 0],
q∗ − Ch ≤ q0 ≤ q∗,q ∗ − Ch ≤ qN ≤ q∗. (4.5)45
Proof. By (4.4), the LHS in (2.15) is O(h), and B(γ) is bounded away from 0 uniformly
in h since γ is bounded. Hence, by using (2.2) and (2.14), we conclude from (2.15), that
0 ≤ u(q0) − q0 ≤ Ch and 0 ≤ u(qN) − q0 ≤ Ch,w h e r eC>0 is independent of h.
Since γ ∈ (0,1], part e) of Lemma 4.3 shows that q0 is bounded away from 0, hence
q0 → q∗,a n dt h e nqN → q∗,t o o . S i n c eu0(q∗) − 1 < 0a n du ∈ C1,w es e et h a ti n
as u ﬃciently small neighborhood of q∗, a function q 7→ u(q) − q is invertible, and the
inverse, call it f, decreases and has a bounded derivative. By applying f to an estimate
Ch ≥ u(q0) − q0 ≥ 0, and using the Lagrange formula, we obtain −C1h ≤ q0 ≤ q∗.A f t e r
that we have −C2h + q∗ ≤ u(qN) ≤ q∗.S i n c eu0(q∗) 6=0 ,t h ei n v e r s eu−1 has a bounded
derivative in a suﬃciently small neighborhood of q∗. We apply u−1 to the last inequality,
use the Lagrange formula and ￿nish the proof of (4.5). ⁄
4.2. Proofs of Main Theorems. P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . 1. If k>1i s￿xed, h → +0, and
γ remains bounded, then (4.5) holds, and (2.12) implies q∗ + O(h) ≥ kq∗ + O(h). For
small h,t h i si si m p o s s i b l e .
Proofs of Theorems 2.2 and 2.3. By Lemma 4.7, q0 and qN are in small vicinity of q∗.
For these q0 and qN,a n dγ ≤ C, we prove two useful estimates. Since u ∈ C1((0,+∞))
and u0(q∗) < 1, we conclude from (4.5), that there exist c>0a n dh0 > 0s . t .i fh ∈ (0,h 0]
then
u
0(q0) ≤ 1 − c, u
0(qN) ≤ 1 − c. (4.6)
Further, let φ be from the proof of Lemma 4.3:





p1 + h + p0(1 − M0)(1 − u0(q0))/(1 + γ)
p1
.




where c>0 is independent of h ∈ (0,h 0], and h0 > 0i ss u ﬃciently small. By using (4.6)



























It follows that an optimal X cannot be an interior point, and a constraint (2.12) is non-








a constraint u(q0) ≥ q0 is non-binding as well: we may decrease qN if we are at this part
























therefore the maximum of Φ is attained when u(qN)=q0, i.e. (2.24) hold. From (2.15),




[u(q0) − q0]. (4.8)







where q0 = q0(γ) is given as a (unique) positive solution to (4.8). By diﬀerentiating (4.8),
we obtain





(1 + γ)2 [q0 − u(q0)].
Since u ∈ C1, (4.5) implies that the RHS is O(h), and by (4.6),
(h + p0(1 − M0)[1 − u
0(q0)])/(1 + γ)) ≥ c,
where c>0 is independent of h ∈ (0,h 0]. Hence,
q
0
0 = O(h). (4.9)
By (4.6), 1 − u0(q0) > 0, and since q0 − u(q0) < 0,
q
0





















By (2.12), we consider only q0 for which u(q0) − ku−1(q0) ≥ 0 holds, then (4.10) and the
last estimate give χ0(γ) > 0. Thus, if γ < 1, we may enlarge it and obtain a larger value
of χ; a condition u(q0) ≥ q0 remains intact, due to (4.8).
Thus, in an equilibrium (if it exists at all) we must have γ = 1, then (4.8) reduces to
(2.23), and (2.23) requires that (2.29) hold.
This proves statements in parts a) ￿ c) of Theorem 2.2 and corresponding statements
in part a) of Theorem 2.3 about q0,q N and γ. To prove that qm0 = q0,n o t et h a tu n d e r
condition (2.23), equations (2.15) and (2.16) are identical, each possessing the only positive
root.47
Since u satis￿es (4.1), and u(q0) >q 0 by (2.23), we have q0 <q ∗, and after that qN <q 0
follows from (2.1) and (4.1). By applying (4.1) once again, we obtain q∗ <q ∗,a n dt h e n
for small h, (4.5) gives q∗ <q N <q 0. Also, (4.5) implies that q0 → q∗ and qN → q∗ as
h → 0.
This proves parts d) and e) of Theorem 2.2 and corresponding statements in part a) of
Theorem 2.3.
It remains to prove part b) of Theorem 2.3. If u(q0(1)) − ku−1(q0(1)) < 0, then there
is no equilibrium since (2.12) is violated for any γ ∈ (0,1]: u(q0(γ)−ku−1(q0(γ)) < 0. To
see this, consider curves y = u(q)a n dy = ku−1(q). By our assumption, on (q0(1),+∞),
the latter is above the former, but q0(γ) increases as γ decreases.
Thus, Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 have been proved.
Finally, to prove (2.28), it suﬃces to calculate the ￿rst two terms of the asymptotics
of q0 = q0(h)a sh → +0 (from (2.23)), then from (2.24) ￿ the ￿rst two terms of the
asymptotics of qN = qN(q0(h)), and substitute into (2.10). By diﬀerentiating (2.23), we
￿nd q0

























0(q∗) − 1) − hk1q∗p/2+O(h
2)=





Proof of Theorem 2.5. Set ￿ h =2 h/(p0(1 − M0)) and notice that
1) q0 = q0(￿ h) is a unique positive solution to an equation (1 + ￿ h)q = u(q);







χ(￿ h)=u(q0(￿ h)) − u
−1(q0(￿ h)) = q0(￿ h) − u
−1(q0(￿ h)) + q0(￿ h).
By using equalities q0(0) = u−1(q0(0)) = q∗ and the Implicit Function Theorem, we can
￿nd Ψ(0) = 0, and calculate explicitly χ0(0) and χ￿(0); after that, using inequalities
u0(q∗) > 0a n du￿(q∗) < 0, we check that χ￿(0) < 0 (calculations are standard, lengthy
and available on request). Now, by using the Taylor formula in the neighborhood of 0,
we obtain
Ψ(￿ h)=χ
0(0) + ￿ hχ￿(0)/2+o(￿ h).
It follows that Ψ decreases in a neighborhood of 0. When h is small, and M0 is bounded
away from 1, ￿ h is small as well, so the last formula is applicable. If h is ￿xed and M
decreases, ￿ h decreases as well, hence Ψ(￿ h(M)) increases.48
5. Appendix: Technical results for type-IIM equilibria
Proof of Lemma 3.2. By (1.2), both statements are equivalent.
¿From (3.7) and (3.11), it follows that h/(1 − N − M0) → 0a s† → 0, and therefore
(1.27) gives that u(qm0)−qm0 → 0a n du(qm1)−qm0 → 0a s† → 0. If we take into account
(3.5), then we obtain qm0 ∼ q∗,q m1 ∼ q∗ as † → 0, where q∗ is a unique positive root of
an equation u(q)=q.
If xm1 > 0, then from (1.8), we conclude that u(q0)=o(1), and then q0 = o(u(q0)).
Hence, u(q0) >q 0.
Suppose, xm1 =0a n du(q0) <q 0;t h e n
1) x0 = 0, and from (1.26), qN = u−1[(1 + h/p1)−1q0], and
2) a subsystem (1.27), (1.29) uniquely de￿nes qm1 and qm0 as functions of γ;b o t ha r e
independent of qN and q0. We conclude, that for γ ￿xed, 1-sector chooses qN ￿e q u i v a l e n t l y ,




s.t. u(q0) <q 0. But it is easy to see that where u(q0) <q 0 and Φ(q0) ≥ 0, Φ decreases,
and q 7→ q − u(q) increases, hence neither q0 with u(q0) <q 0 can be optimal, and our
assumption has lead to a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Since γ ≤ 1/x∗ and (3.7) hold, we have, as † → 0:
from (1.26) and (3.11):
u(q0) − q0 = O(†),u (qN) − q0 = O(†); (5.1)
from (1.27) and (3.11):
u(qm0) − qm0 = O(†),u (qm1) − qm0 = O(†). (5.2)
Consider separately two cases: γ ≥ 1, and γ ∈ (0,1).
If γ ≥ 1, then xm1 = xm1 + x
+
m1 = x∗, and from (1.29) and (3.11) we conclude that
kqm1 = u(qm0) − u(q0)+O(†). (5.3)
If q0 → 0, then u(q0)/q0 → +∞, which contradicts (1.26) in view of (3.11). Hence, from
(5.1), q0 = q∗ + O(†), and qN = q∗ + O(†). Similarly, (3.5) and (5.2) give qm0 = q∗ + O(†)
and qm1 = q∗ + O(†). But then (5.3) implies qm1 = O(†), a contradiction.
Hence, γ ∈ (0,1). For these γ, we have similarly to (5.1)￿(5.3)
u(q0) − q0 = O(h),u (qN) − q0 = O(h); (5.4)
u(qm0) − qm0 = O(h),u (qm1) − qm0 = O(h); (5.5)
kqm1 = u(qm1) − γu(qm0)+O(h). (5.6)
(5.4)￿(5.5) give
Q = q∗ + O(h), ∀ Q ∈ {q0,q N,q m0,q m1}, (5.7)
and since k ≥ 1a n dγ < 1, (5.6) and (5.7) are compatible only if k − 1=O(h)a n d
γ = O(h). If xm0 > 0, we can use (5.7) and rewrite (1.8) as
γu(q0) ≥ u(q0)+O(h);49
from (5.7), we see that O(h) ≥ q∗ + O(h). For suﬃciently small h,t h i si si m p o s s i b l e .
Thus, xm0 = 0, and Lemma 3.3 has been proved.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. a) and b) If 1-sector chooses q1 = q∗,w eh a v eu(q∗) − kq∗ > 0,
and (3.18) gives V 1 ≥ ch−1,w h e r ec>0 is independent of h>0. Now, for small h,( 5 . 7 )
gives b) and proves that this choice of q1 is really optimal. Since this q1 is independent
of x1 and qN, a) follows.
c) Since xm1 = 0, (1.8) reduces to u(qm0) − kqm1 <u (q0), which holds due to (5.7).
d) The proof is the same as the ￿rst part of the proof of Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 in
Subsection 4.2.
Lemma 3.5 has been proved.
Proof of Theorem 3.6 c). This is (5.7).
Proof of Theorem 3.7. ¿From (5.7), there exist C1 and h0 > 0s u c ht h a tf o rh ∈ (0,h 0]
and γ ∈ [0,1),
Φ(γ) ≤ C1 + h
−1(1 − k)q∗.
If C>C 1/q∗ and k ≥ 1+Ch, Φ(γ) < 0, hence it is not optimal to issue notes.
Proof of Lemma 3.9. On the strength of (5.7), we look for q0,q N,q m0 and qm1 in the
form
q0 = q∗(1 + q01h + O(h
2)),q N = q∗(1 + qN1h + O(h
2)), (5.8)
qm0 = q∗(1 + qm01h + O(h
2)),q m1 = q∗(1 + qm11h + O(h
2)). (5.9)
By substituting (5.8) into (3.21), using the Taylor formula around h = 0, and equating





0(q∗) − 1)B(γ)). (5.10)






= q∗(1 + hq01/u
0(q∗)+O(h
2)). (5.11)
By using (5.9), we deduce from (3.22)

















= q∗(1 + hu




After simpli￿cation, we obtain
(u






B(γ)−1 + D(γ)u0(q∗)(k1 + G(γ))
(u0(q∗) − 1)(1 + D(γ)(1 + u0(q∗)))
(5.13)
By using (5.8)￿(5.11), we deduce (2.24)￿(2.25).
Similarly, from (5.12)￿(5.13),
h







2 − 1)qm01 − u
0(q∗)(k1 + G(γ))] + O(h)=
=




0(q∗)(k1 + G(γ)) + O(h)=
=
q∗u0(q∗)


















and parts b)￿c) of Lemma follow.51
Possible Extensions and Ramifications
By using our model as a benchmark, it is possible to introduce additional frictions
and/or externalities.
For instance, it is straightforward to modify the model so that
1) an exogenous probability of a note to become worthless is given;
2) taxation in a form of exogenous probability of a unit of money to be taken away by
a government agent is introduced;
3) ineﬀective agents may pay some cost of restructuring and become type-0 agents;
4) type-0 agents are more mobile, so that a Poisson rate of arrival of meetings ￿type-0￿
type-0￿ is larger than the one of meetings ￿type-0￿type-1￿, and the latter is larger than
the one of meetings ￿type-1￿type-1￿;
5) a type-0 agent can invest in her ability to ￿nd trading partners, i.e. to pay for an
increase of the Poisson rate of arrival of her trading partners.
The following possibilities are also feasible but more diﬃcult.
It is very interesting to analyze how the economy react to some shocks, i.e. to consider a
dynamic model for small ￿uctuations around a steady state found in this paper. Especially
interesting would be to analyze the dependence of the welfare on the size of the note-issuing
sector since it is a source of endogenous supply of liquidity in the economy.
It is also possible to consider a stochastic dynamical model (also for small ￿uctuations),
when some exogenous factors, like the money supply, level of taxes and/or parameters
characterizing u evolve stochastically, and analyze how this uncertainty aﬀects the decision
to restructure.
Finally, it would be very interesting to develop corresponding models with many levels
of ineﬀectiveness; in the pure monetary case, it has been done in Boyarchenko (1999).
Conclusion
We have considered an economy where
1. There are two sectors: a sector of ineﬀective agents (1-sector) who can collude
and issue universally accepted notes (inside money), and a sector of eﬀective agents who
cannot collude and issue universally accepted notes.
2. There may be genuine money (outside money) as well, and there may be none, so that
only notes are circulating (we consider such economies in Boyarchenko and Levendorski￿ i
(1999); in Boyarchenko (1999), pure monetary economy with heterogeneous agents is
considered).
3. Even inside each sector, agents are heterogeneous in a sense that they have idiosyn-
cratic tastes for goods, and they specialize in production, too.
We have introduced such characteristics of the trading process as the trading friction,
and showed that essential properties of equilibria and the very existence of the equilibria
strongly depend on the trading friction, the ineﬀectiveness of agents of 1-sector, the money
supply and the degree of specialization in consumption.
We classi￿ed possible equilibria when the trading friction is small, and made a series of
policy recommendations. In particular, we have shown that if the friction is small, and
the agents are rather ineﬀective, then only equilibria with bad properties (too many notes52
in circulation and too low level of production) are possible, if there remains the trade
between sectors; if, in addition, agents are not very picky, then an equilibrium with the
trade between sectors does not exist at all.
If agents are suﬃciently eﬀective and the trading friction is small then there may exist
one or both of the following equilibria:
1. an equilibrium where there are no money ￿ows between the two sectors because
1-sector ￿nds it optimal to produce only zero quantities of good for money (type-IM
equilibrium), and
2. an equilibrium where both money and notes are used in trades between the two
sectors, a special case being a pure monetary economy (type-IIM equilibrium).
We have shown that if the trading friction is very small, then type-IIM equilibria are
inferior from the point of view of the welfare of 1-sector, hence it would not use money
unless forced by some exogenous (from the point of view of the model) factor, like the
necessity to pay taxes with money (to treat this situation consistently, our model should be
modi￿ed). This agrees with previous ￿ndings by N.Wallace and others about superiority
of inside money to outside money (see Introduction).
Nevertheless, if the trading friction is not very small, and type-1 agents are fairly
eﬀective, then a type-IIM equilibrium is superior for them.
We have introduced the instability index and instability threshold a n ds h o w e dt h a tt y p e -
IIM equilibria are more fragile than type-IM equilibria in the sense that the instability
threshold for the former is lower than that for the latter.
Finally, we analyzed possible eﬀects of an increase (decrease) of the money supply and
showed that
1. At small levels of money supply, its increase can lead to a revitalization of a signi￿cant
part of eﬀectively dead ineﬀective type-1 agents, which improves the welfare of eﬀective
agents, and conversely, a small decrease of the money supply may result in a signi￿cant
part of the economy to become isolated from the rest of it and a source of an additional
liquidity to disappear, which leads to decrease of the welfare of eﬀective agents.
2. Similar eﬀects are observed when the trading friction decreases and increases, and/or
the utility of consumption increases and decreases (due to some taste shock, say), respec-
tively.
3. At moderately high levels of money supply, an increase of the money supply leads to
an improvement of the welfare of rather ineﬀective 1-sector, but if it is eﬀective, it would
rather have no money in economy at all. For agents of 0-sector, the eﬀect of the increase
may be positive or negative, the last possibility realizing when a fairly eﬀective part of
1-sector starts to use money, and not only notes, as they do at low levels of the money
supply.
4. At high levels of money supply, the welfare of all agents decreases when the money
supply grows.
5. Starting from not very high levels of the money supply, type-0 agents would be
better oﬀ if they stop trade with the note-issuing sector at all, and live by themselves;
however, in order to realize this possibility, they must be able to collude, which is not the
case, ￿ or a policy maker must eﬀectively forbid the notes. An economy would continue
to use notes, if left alone.53
6. A decrease of the trading friction makes everybody better oﬀ ￿ but only in a region
where type-1 agents remain alive for 0-sector. When they eﬀectively die, the welfare of
0-agents drops.
7. If 1-sector is eﬀective and the trading friction is small, then an optimal money supply
from the point of view of 1-sector is 0, and the same holds for small positive levels of the
ineﬀectiveness, k − 1. If k − 1 is not small, there exists a positive level of money supply
which is optimal from the point of view of 1-sector.
If the existing money supply is at or above an optimal level, there is a strong incentive
for 1-sector to transfer new money out of the economy, should the new money arrive (by
making an agreement to sell their goods for money though it is not optimal in a steady
state; to treat this eﬀect properly, one has to modify the model and make it a sort of a
model of a small open economy.) This observation may provide an additional explanation
for the capital ￿ight. The more eﬀective 1-sector, the lower an optimal amount of the
money in the economy for this sector, hence the larger the incentive for the capital ￿ight.
Policy conclusions
In an economy with rather ineﬀective 1-sector, at low levels of the money supply, a
policy maker can eﬀectively control the size of the ineﬀective sector by
decreasing the money supply and/or improving the infrastructure (i.e. making the trad-
ing friction smaller), if she wishes the ineﬀective agents to die (in the sense isolated from
the rest of an economy; if we introduce the taxation into the model, they will become
bankrupt), or
increasing the money supply and creating some arti￿cial obstacles for eﬀective trade
(i.e. making the trading friction larger), if she wishes them to remain alive.
Notice that in the present model, where we do not consider a possibility of restructuring,
the ￿rst course of actions leads to a steep drop of the welfare of eﬀective agents, and the
second one ￿ to a jump.
By choosing her policy, a policy maker should be aware of a snow-balling eﬀect: when a
change of money supply causes the size of an alive part of an ineﬀective note-issuing sector
to increase or decrease, the latter may continue to do so and increase (resp., decrease) to
unforseen, and, perhaps, undesirable levels.
A policy maker cannot make an economy to stop using notes by increasing the money
supply to high levels: though eﬀective type-0 agents would be better oﬀ if they stop
trading with ineﬀective agents and using notes, they could not change the type of the
equilibrium since they cannot collude.
So, if a policy maker wishes to get rid of notes, without causing large welfare losses, she
must simultaneously increase the money supply and eﬀectively forbid the usage of notes,
by creating some arti￿cial obstacles to the usage.
¿From the point of view of our model, the most natural thing to do is the simultaneous
￿ increase of the money supply;
￿ demonopolization of note-issuing large ￿rms, like Gazprom and UES ￿ notes of
smaller ￿rms are less acceptable, and
￿ heavy taxation of intermediaries involved in organizing of barter chains.54
Finally, the investment in the energy sector (a core of the sector of colluding agents) at
the expense of restructured enterprises of 0-sector may have a side-eﬀect: an additional
incentive for the capital ￿ight.
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